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A B S T R A C T 
Secure Implementation, Network Cost Sharing and Ologopolistic Price 
Discrimination 
Rajnish Kumar 
In chapter 1, we consider the possibility of Secure Implementation in Produc-
tion Economies beyond the result provided in the Saijo et al. (2007) paper. We 
find a large class of SCFs to be securely implementable. The serial SCF and the 
widely studied Fixed Path SCFs which contains serial SCF as a special case are 
all special cases of our function. 
In chapter 2, which is a version of my work with Ruben Juarez, we consider 
the problem of sharing the cost of a network formed by choice of paths of agents 
to connect their demand nodes. Motivated by the inefficiency, instability and huge 
informational requirements of the widely used Shapley (Sh) cost sharing rules, 
we look for mechanisms in a setting of minimal informational requirement which 
iii 
overcome the said shortcoming. We characterize a class of such mechanisms un-
der different notions of robust implementations. We also discover that voluntary 
participation is possible in this setup with no more inefficiency than that of Sh. 
In chapter 3, which is a version of my work with Levent Kutlu, we consider 
the aspect of price discrimination under oligopolistic setting. The environment has 
two stages of the game. In first stage the firms fight on the quantity they want to 
put in the market and then in the second stage they decide how to distribute that 
quantity among the buyers with different valuations. We characterize the unique 
NE of this game. The firms which ends up with higher quantity in the first stage 
sells to all the buyers whereas the smaller firm sells some of the high end buyers. 
iii 
Acknowledgement s 
First and foremost I offer my sincere gratitude to my advisor or my academic 
father, Dr. Herve Moulin, without whom this work would not have existed. He 
has been my inspiration, guidance and support throughout the work of the thesis. 
On the one extreme, supporting me with his knowledge and patience and on the 
other, giving me the freedom to work on my own way, I just could not wish for a 
better advisor. 
I owe my deep gratitude to my Micro teachers, Dr. Simon Grant, Dr. Anna 
Bogomolnaia and Dr. Geoffroy de Clippel for teaching me the way to think which 
I have been and will be using while solving problems. I am grateful to my teachers 
Dr. James N. Brown, Dr. Mahmoud El-Gamal, Dr. Juan Cordoba, Dr. Yoosoon 
Chang, Dr. Peter Hartley, Dr. Robin C. Sickles, Dr. Ronald Soligo and Dr. Marc 
P. Dudey for teaching me various fields in Economics. 
I want to thank my co-authors Dr. Ruben Juarez and Dr. Levent Kutlu for 
the wonderful working experience I had with them. I thank my classmates Yongok 
Choi, TYang Dinh, Sinan Ertemel, Jiaqi Hao, Xiao He, Ekaterina Magakova and 
Michael Naaman for making the experience at Rice wonderful. I thank our program 
coordinator Altha Rodgers for all her helps throughout my graduate program. I 
iii 
also thank all my friends at Rice and in Houston for making Houston a home for 
me. 
It is an honor for me to thank my teacher Dr. Arunava Sen for being the 
motivation to pursue my research in the field of Social Choice Theory and also 
continuously giving suggestion for the research. Various discussions with Dr. Ma-
nipushpak Mitra, Dr. Dipjyoti Majumdar, Dr. Anirban Kar, Dr. Justin Leroux, 
Dr. Gaurab Aryal and Dr. Siyang Xiong have been extremely helpful in the 
chapter 1 and chapter 2 of the thesis. 
I thank my brothers Manoj Kumar and Manjul Kumar, my sister Vandana 
Sharma and my mother for their unconditional support throughout. Finally, I 
thank my father Late Ramagya Thakur who was the most influential teacher in 
shaping my life and I dedicate this thesis to him. 
iii 
Contents 
ABSTRACT 
Acknowledgements iv 
List of Figures vii 
Chapter 1. Secure Implementation in Production Economies 1 
1.1. Introduction 1 
1.2. Secure implementability 10 
1.3. Serial Cost Sharing Methods 12 
1.4. Serial SCF and generalized serial SCF 20 
1.5. Secure implementability of Generalized Serial Mechanisms and the 
fixed path mechanisms 24 
A Proofs 27 
References 36 
Chapter 2. Implementing Efficient Graphs in Connection Networks 39 
2.1. Introduction 39 
2.2. The model 45 
2.3. Main result 53 
iii 
2.4. Individually rational mechanisms 56 
2.5. Conclusions 58 
2.6. Proofs 59 
References 87 
Chapter 3. Capacity Constraint, Price Discrimination and Oligopoly 89 
3.1. Introduction 89 
3.2. The Model and Results 91 
3.3. Cournot with price discrimination 113 
References 115 
iii 
List of Figures 
1.1 Equilibria of the pivotal mechanism 5 
1.2 Equilibria of the second-price auction 7 
1.3 Fixed path method in two agent case 17 
1.4 Serial SCF in two agent case 21 
2.1 Symmetric networks with a common source and two sinks 40 
2.2 Upper bound on PoS of Sh in undirected graphs for 2 agent case 61 
2.3 Lower bound on PoS of Sh in 2 agent case 62 
2.4 Inefficiency under smaller total cost 70 
2.5 Inefficiency under larger total cost 70 
2.6 Efficiency amounts to separability 72 
2.7 PNI implies strong monotonicity 76 
2.8 Worst case example 85 
iii 
CHAPTER 1 
Secure Implementation in Production Economies 
1.1. Introduction 
We consider the standard implementation problem where an outcome has to be 
chosen from a set of alternatives depending upon the characteristics (e.g., prefer-
ences) of the agents in the society. The rule which chooses this outcome based on 
the true preference profile1 (or any other such characteristic2) of the agents is called 
a Social Choice Function (SCF). The problem of implementing this rule arises be-
cause the above said "characteristics of the agents" may be private information of 
these agents and it may not be in their best interest to reveal these true character-
istics if they know how the outcome is going to be chosen based on their reports. 
To achieve the goal of implementing a SCF it may be the case that the agents 
are directly asked to report their preferences or they may be asked to indulge in 
an indirect process where they interact under certain rules. In both the cases the 
institution which is used creates a game amongst the agents. These institutions are 
called mechanisms or game forms. The case where agents are required to report 
their preferences directly and the outcome is chosen according the SCF is called 
1A preference profile is a set of preferences - one for each agent. 
2In our framework, the characteristics of the agents we are considering are their preferences. 
But, more generally it can be the agents' endowments, the agents' abilities (e.g. production 
technology) etc. 
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direct mechanism. The other one is called indirect mechanism. Strategyproofness 
of direct mechanisms is a requirement on the mechanism that truth telling by each 
agent leads to a most favorable outcome for that agent, no matter what the other 
agents are reporting. In other words, truth-telling is a dominant strategy equi-
librium under the mechanism if the mechanism is strategyproof. It seems natural 
that players will reveal the truth if it is dominant strategy to do so. However, 
the performance of strategyproof mechanisms in achieving socially desired goals 
has been in question for a long time. On the one hand, a sequence of experiments 
show that pivotal mechanisms3 fail to get the truth telling as a unique outcome (see 
Attiyeh et al. [2], Kawagoe and Mori [16], etc ). On the other hand, there are ex-
periments which show that true valuation is not revealed by the subjects in second 
price auction4 experiments ( see Kagel et al. [13], Kagel and Levin [14] ). Some 
experimentalists argue that the subjects who don't play their dominant strategy 
must be confused by the complexity of the mechanisms where the dominant strat-
egy may not be that clear. But neither epistemic(Aumann and Brandenburger [1] 
) nor evolutive(Hurwicz [12], Smith [27] ) models of game theory provide unam-
biguous support for the elimination of weakly dominated strategies. In fact the 
only prediction that is supported in these models is that the outcome must be a 
Nash Equilibrium (NE). 
3Pivotal mechanisms are strategyproof mechanisms in the problem of provision of public goods 
4Second price auction is another example of strategyproof mechanism where the highest bidder 
gets the object and pays the highest losers bid. Others pay nothing. 
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This leads us to think of two problems associated with strategyproof mecha-
nisms. First, truth-telling may not be an agent's unique dominant strategy and 
using wrong dominant strategy may lead to wrong outcomes. Second, there can 
be NE other than the dominant strategy equilibrium which lead to wrong out-
comes. To see this problem, consider a simple example of pivotal mechanism for 
two players. Suppose there is a costless public project to be undertaken if and 
only if the sum of the (reported) valuations of the project by the two agents is non 
negative. It is well known since Clarke [4] that the transfers according to pivotal 
mechanism5 induce truth telling as a dominant strategy equilibrium. It is fairly 
easy to see that no one can gain by reporting anything other than the true value 
irrespective of what the other is reporting. However, the true profile is not the only 
NE. As a matter of fact, as is demonstrated in figure 1.1 below, almost half of the 
two dimensional Euclidian space constitute the set of NE. Here, the axes represent 
the type (valuation) space of the agents and since the pivotal mechanism is a direct 
mechanism they also represent the strategy space of the agents. Notice that the 
area which correspond to the set of NE (the shaded area) has two regions. In the 
first region (which is shaded green), the corresponding outcome is socially desired. 
However, there exists another region (which is shaded yellow) of the similar size 
where the NE leads to outcome which is not socially desired. 
5A transfer tt to agent i according to pivotal mechanism in this environment will be equal to the 
— \vj \ if agent i is pivotal i.e. absence of agent i would have changed the decision of undertaking 
the social project. Here, vk is the valuation of agent k for the public project. In other words, 
If the presence of an agent alters the outcome in her favor, she must compensate the others for 
their (revealed) welfare loss. 
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Secure implementation (Saijo et al. [25] ) is one way to remedy this problem 
faced by the strategyproof mechanisms. Secure implementation of a SCF requires 
the existence of a mechanism under which there is a dominant strategy equilibrium 
which leads to the socially desired outcome and all the NE under the mechanism 
also lead to the socially desired outcome. This mode of implementation has been 
tested on data and has been found to be performing significantly better than strat-
egyproof mechanisms under the presence of multiple NEs ( Cason et al. [5] ). This 
nice property of secure implementation doesn't come without costs. In many envi-
ronments there doesn't exist non trivial SCFs which are securely implementable. 
Following are some of the examples. 
Consider a public good provision problem where the good must be provided if 
and only if the sum of valuations is non-negative. We have just seen above that 
the pivotal mechanism doesn't securely implement this SCF. Notice that this SCF 
is efficient i.e. it maximizes the social surplus. It has been shown in theorem 7 in 
( Saijo et al. [25] ) that there doesn't exist any surplus maximizing SCF which 
can be securely implementable6. This negative result of incompatibility between 
surplus-maximizing and secure implementation in the quasilinear environment7 
with discrete social decision is further illustrated by the second price auction where 
6This result is valid even when the consider multivalued Social Choice Correspondences (SCC) 
in place of SCFs. 
7Quasilinear preferences are represented by utility function which is additive and linear in one 
commodity called money. 
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a large set of NE correspond to the non-surplus-maximizing outcome8. To see this 
point, consider a two player example where the valuation for the object to be 
auctioned are 9X and 02 by agent 1 and agent 2 respectively. Suppose, 9i > 92 > 0. 
In order to maximize the total surplus, it must be the case that object is allocated 
to agent 1. But, as we see in figure 1.2 below, the set of NE is quite large. The 
lower right set of NE correspond to the surplus maximizing outcome whereas the 
upper left set of NE end up allocating the object to agent 2. 
Agent 2 Agent; 
Bad Nafsh 
area 
Good Nash 
5
 a r e a
 Agent 1 
'true value 
(a) 
Bad Nash 
area 
area 
. Agent 1 
V 
true 
value 
(b) 
Figure 1.1. Equilibria of the pivotal mechanism 
Another environment is where the social decision is a continuous variable but 
there are no transfers involved. Consider a single-peaked voting environment where 
the set of alternatives is A = [0,1] and set of possible preferences are those that 
Surplus maximization here means that the private good to be auctioned must be allocated to 
the agent with the highest valuation. 
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are continuous and single-peaked9 on A. In such an environment one can find nice 
SCFs which are strategyproof such as the median voter rule10. Median voter rule 
enjoys nice properties like pareto-efficiency, non-dictatorship, non-bossiness apart 
from strategyproofness (in fact, group-strategyproofness). However, this rule is 
not securely implement able. Similarly, other well known-known rules, such as the 
one which picks the smallest of the peaks, are not securely implementable. As a 
matter of fact, it has been shown in theorem 8 of ( Saijo et al. [25] ) that only rules 
which are securely implementable in this environment are the dictatorial rules. If 
we relax the rule and allow it be multivalued then we can get non-dictatorial rules 
but they can not be pareto-efficient. 
There are more recent negative results. Bochet and Sakai [3] show that in 
allotment economies the securely implementable rules are either efficient (priority 
rules) or symmetric (equal division) but not both. They also show that in "uniform 
rule" bad Nash Equilibria can be avoided but for that we need to allow for pre 
play talk among the players which is a different set up of implementation in itself. 
Fujinaka and Wakayama [11] show that in an economy with indivisible objects and 
money, the only securely implementable rules are the constant rules. 
The above examples show how difficult it is to find securely implementable 
rules which have other nice properties. However, there are environments where 
9Single-peaked preferences requires the existence of a point p(ui) for each i called the peak of 
agent i with preference u^  such that Uj is strictly increasing before p(ut) and strictly decreasing 
after p(uj). 
10Median voter rule picks the median of {p(ui)} I gn given a profile u. 
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Agent 2's bid 
true value 
Good Nash area 
91 Agent l's bid 
Figure 1.2. Equilibria of the second-price auction 
securely implementable rules do exist. For example, such environments are found 
in quasilinear setup where the social decision is a continuous variable. It has been 
shown in Saijo et al. [25] that serial SCF ( Moulin and Shenker [17] ) is securely 
implementable in the one input one output production economy with convex cost 
technology. We look for other possible SCFs which are securely implementable in 
such environments. We find out that it is not just the serial SCF which is securely 
implementable but a class of SCFs called generalized serial SCFs (GSS) defined in 
( Shenker [26] ) are also securely implementable when the technology has convex 
cost. 
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The generalized serial SCFs are described for production economies with smooth 
production technologies. By smooth production technology we mean that the fea-
sible consumption bundle must lie on some smooth manifold in Rm. Each agent 
reports his utility function which is defined over R™ and is non-decreasing, con-
tinuous, locally non-satiated and quasi-concave. Then, the mechanism allocates 
the set of feasible bundles corresponding to the unique NE of an underlying game. 
The GSS are more general than other generalizations of Serial Mechanism whose 
incentive properties have been studied in the literature. Among these are the Fixed 
Path Methods (FPM) where the share of total cost paid by an agent is decided by 
a path in i?" where n is the number of agents. This path does not depend on the 
demand vector. We find out that under some assumptions on the cost functions 
and on the preferences (which guarantee the desired incentive properties of such 
methods), the FPMs are in fact special cases of GSS and thus all such FPMs are 
securely implementable. However, there are GSS which can not be represented as 
Fixed Path Methods. We conjecture that if we require the mechanism to be non-
constant, symmetric (anonymous) and smooth then GSS are the only mechanisms 
which are securely implementable. 
At this point, it is very important to note the intuition why the serial SCF 
(or more generally the GSS) have such nice incentive property of secure imple-
mentability whereas, as we will discuss later, the SCF corresponding to other well 
known cost sharing rules like the Aumann-Shapley rule (which is the proportional 
9 
rule in homogeneous goods case) does not share this feature11. In the latter, by 
changing the report an agent can affect the outcome for all the agents simulta-
neously. In particular, that agent's report changes the outcomes of such agents 
whose report in turn can change his outcome. This severe nature of externality in 
such SCF violates the acyclicity condition necessary for the combination of non-
bossiness and strategyproofness ( see Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein [29] ) of the 
SCF which in turn is necessary for secure implementability. Under the serial SCF, 
on the contrary, the protection of lower demanders12 from the demands of the 
higher demanders makes the externality one sided which is not that severe. More 
precisely, a change in the report of low demander changes the outcomes for all 
the high demanders whereas small change in the report of high demanders doesn't 
affect the outcome for the lower demanders. 
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. In section 2 we precisely introduce 
the notion of secure implementability and give one proposition which characterizes 
the securely implementable SCFs. In section 3 we define the serial cost sharing 
method and introduce some generalizations considered in literature with special 
focus on the ones whose strategic properties have been studied. In section 4 we 
define serial SCF and GSS and in section 5 we present two of our main results. 
The main proofs are gathered in the appendix A. 
11The SCF corresponding to the Aumann-Shapley rule is not even strategyproof 
12By low demander in homogeneous case we mean an agent who gets smaller share of the output 
and pays lower level of input as the final outcome of the SCF. In heterogeneous case, all the 
generalizations of serial mechanism rank the agents in an order based on different criteria. 
10 
1.2. Secure implementability 
We consider an arbitrary set of alternatives A and a finite set of agents N = 
{1, 2, ..., n} , where n > 2. Typical agents are represented by alphabets i, j etc. 
The preference relation of agent i over the set A is represented by utility function 
Ui. The set of admissible utility functions for agent i is denoted by L^.The cartesian 
product of Ui, U2,...., Un is represented by U i.e. U = x Ui. A typical element 
i€N 
of U is a utility profile u = (ui,....un) which is an n-tuple of utility functions-
one for each agent. A social choice function (SCF) / : U —> A, is a function that 
associates with every u E U a unique alternative f(u) in A. A mechanism (or a 
game form) g : S A is a function that assigns to every s G S a unique element 
of A, where S = x Si and Sl is the strategy space of agent i. 
i£N 
Definition 1.1. The mechanism g is called a direct revelation mechanism as-
sociated with the SCF f if Si = Ui for alii 6 N and g{u) = f(u) for all u £ U. 
Some times we may refer a direct revelation mechanism as the SCF if no confu-
sion arises. When the strategies of agents j ^ i is fixed at = (si, s2 , . . , Sj_i, s i + i , . . . , sn), 
agent i can induce certain outcomes by choosing strategies from the set Si. The set 
of such outcomes denoted by g(Si, s_i) is called the attainable set or the opportunity 
set of agent i at s_j. More formally, <7(Si, s_j) = {b e A|3sj e Si s.t.g(si, S-i) = b}. 
The set of alternatives that agent i with utility Ui ranks weakly below the alterna-
tive a e A is called the weak lower contour set for agent i with utility u{ at a and 
is denoted by L(a,Ui). More formally, L(a,Ui) = {b E A\ui(a) > Ui(b)}. Given the 
11 
mechanism g : S —* A, the strategy profile s G S is a Nash Equilibrium (NE) of 
g at u G U if V? G N , g(Si,S-i) C L(g(s),Ui). Let's denote by N9(u) the set of 
Nash equilibria of g at u. 
Definition 1.2. The mechanism g implements f in Nash equilibria if for all 
u G U , (i) 3 s G N9(u) st. g(s) = f(u) and (ii) Ms G N9(u), g(s) = f(u). 
The SCF / is Nash implementable if there exists a mechanism that implements 
/ in Nash equilibria. Given the mechanism g : S —> A, the strategy profile 
s G S is a Dominant strategy Equilibrium of g at u G U if Vi G AT,V5_j G S-i, 
g ( S i , S - i ) C L(g(si,s-i),Ui). Let's denote by DS9(u) the set of dominant strategy 
equilibria of g at u. 
Definition 1.3. The mechanism g implements f in Dominant Strategy equi-
libria if for allu eU , (i) 3 s G DS9{u) st. g{s) = f(u) and (ii) Vs G DS9(u), 
g(s) = /(«). 
The SCF / is Dominant Strategy implementable if there exists a mechanism 
that implements / in Dominant Strategy equilibria. We now introduce formally 
the concept of secure implementation which requires the existence of a mechanism 
which implements the the SCF in Nash equilibria as well as in Dominant Strategy 
equilibria. 
Definition 1.4. The mechanism g securely implements the SCF f if for all 
ueu , (i)3 se DS9(u) St. g(s) = f(u) and (ii) Vs G N9(u), g{s) = f(u). 
12 
The SCF / is securely implementable (SI) if there exists a mechanism that 
securely implements / . Strategyproofness is a requirement on a SCF that truth 
telling by the agents is a dominant strategy under the direct revelation mecha-
nism. More formally, the SCF / satisfies strategy proofness (SP) if, Vu e U, Mi € 
N,VHi G U i , u i ( f ( u ) ) ^ ui(f(ui,u-i)). Another technical property on the SCF, 
introduced in Saijo e.t. al. [25], which together with strategyproofness charac-
terizes secure implementability is called rectangularity property and is defined as 
following. The SCF / satisfies the rectangularity property (RP) if for all u,u E U, 
if ui{f(ui,u-i)) — ui(f(ui,u-i)) for all i e N,then f(u) = f(u). The following 
characterization due to Saijo e.t. al. [25] will be used in one of our main results. 
Proposition 1.1. (Saijo e.t. al. [25],); A SCF f is Securely Implementable 
if and only if f satisfies Strategyproofness and Rectangularity Property. 
1.3. Serial Cost Sharing Methods 
Serial cost sharing method was first introduced for an environment where the 
goods demanded by the agents are homogeneous or, in other words, the agents 
demand various quantities of the same good. Since our purpose here is to extend 
this method to more general settings, we will define the problem in an environment 
where each agent i £ N demands q.L e [0, g m a x ] c R+ quantity13 a personalized14 
i3qmax c a n BE OQ 
14In some of the more general models e.g., [17], [15], each agent may demand quantities of some 
or all of the goods. 
13 
good i. Thus qi, the ith. component of vector q E R+ ,can be thought of as the 
demand for good i as well as the demand of agent i. The cost of serving these 
demands is C(q), which must be divided among the agents; the cost share of agent 
i is given by Xi(q;C). The preferences of agent i is defined over R2 which is 
continuous, increasing in qi, decreasing in Xi and the upper contour set is convex15. 
Let a concave utility function Ui(qi,Xi) represent the preference of agent i. Recall 
that for the homogeneous goods case C(q) = C(qiv) where, Qn = X^ewft- Here 
the serial cost sharing method is defined as follows. Consider, Without loss of 
generality q1 < q2 < .... < qn. Define, ql = (qlt q2,..., qi} qi,..., qi) then , 
This method works as follows. Agent 1, with the lowest demand q\ pays 1/n 
th of the cost of nqi. Agent 2, with the second lowest demand pays agent l 's cost 
share, plus l / (n — l)th of the incremental cost from nq\ to q\ + (n — 1 )q%. Agent 
3, with the next lowest demand pays agent 2's cost share, plus l / (n — 2) th of 
the incremental cost from q\ + (n — 1)^ 2 to qi + q2 + (n — 2)q3. And so on. This 
method is characterized by "anonymity" and "invariance of the cost share of low 
demanders by a change in the demand of high demanders". The demand game 
15An special case which is widely studied in this framework is the preference which is quasilinear 
in Xi and concave in q^ . 
(1) 
14 
generated by this method is as follows. Each agent has a strategy (demand) space 
which is R+ and his cost share as a function of the demand profile is computed by 
(1). The payoff is given by the utility function defined above. It should be noted 
that the serial cost sharing method (1) is defined for any arbitrary cost function. 
However, if we assume the cost function to be strictly16 convex (increasing marginal 
costs), then this demand game has very strong strategic properties. In this demand 
game the NE is unique, robust to coalitional deviations and the only rationalizable 
strategy profile. Moreover, this NE is the unique outcome of adaptive learning 
(Milgrom and Roberts, [19] ). 
Given the nice strategic and equity properties that the serial method enjoys in 
homogeneous good setting, it is natural to look for the extension for the rule in 
more general settings. In particular, a natural question is what the counterpart of 
the serial method in heterogeneous good (multidimensional) case will be. Among 
the various approaches to extend the Serial Mechanism to the case of heterogeneous 
goods, it is a general consensus ( Koplin [15], Koster et al. [17], Sprumont [28], 
Friedman [7], Friedman and Moulin [9] etc.) that the mechanism must coincide 
with the Serial Mechanism in the homogeneous case. This property is referred to 
as serial extension. But, the task of extending the serial mechanism to heteroge-
nous goods case is not an easy one as was first demonstrated by Koplin [15]. He 
shows using a nice counterexample that serial extension is not compatible with 
16strictness is not needed if the preferences of the agents are strictly convex. 
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other desired properties namely consistency flie calls it direct aggregation invari-
ance), scale invariance and additivity each of which is compelling in its own sense. 
Consistency is the requirement from the cost sharing method that the cost shares 
be invariant if we relabel the commodities. Scale invariance requires that the units 
in which the goods are measured does not affect the cost shares. Additivity is a 
decentralizability axiom which says that if we can separate the production into 
different processes, then we should be able to apply the same cost sharing method 
in each process and the still get the same cost shares. Therefore, knowing that we 
can not be too demanding with respect to serial extension there have been differ-
ent approaches to pin down the class of methods which carry on the properties of 
serial method for homogeneous methods to the heterogeneous goods environment. 
These approaches can be broadly categorized into two groups- one which focusses 
on axiomatic approach ( Koster et al. [17], Sprumont [28]) and the other which 
is concerned about the strategic properties ( Friedman [7], Friedman and Moulin 
[9], Friedman [8]). 
Since we are more interested in the strategic properties, we analyze the second 
approach. Friedman [7] studies the strategic properties of these methods which 
we describe in the next paragraph and finds out that these do enjoy nice strategic 
properties similar to serial cost sharing in homogeneous goods case. He finds out 
16 
that the game induced by such methods is solvable by iterative elimination of 
overwhelmed strategies17 introduced in Friedman & Shenker [10]18. 
This natural extension of the serial method (1) to the heterogeneous case, 
where C (q) is an arbitrary non-decreasing and continuously differentiate function 
of its n variables, which was introduced in Friedman and Moulin [9], is defined as 
follows. Consider a path19 jsc from 0 to q given by 7 s c ( t \ q) = (te) A q, for t > 0, 
where (p A q)i = min{pj, and e = (1,1,..., 1) is the unit vector in RN. This 
path essentially follows the diagonal of the n-dimensional positive orthant till its 
coordinates are smaller than all the coordinates of the demand vector q. As soon 
as it meets the demand of some agent, it starts following the projection of the 
diagonal in the hyperplane where that coordinate is fixed at the demand in that 
coordinate and so on. Given such a path j s c the cost sharing mechanism is given 
by, 
poo 
(2) X?c(q-,C)= $ C ( 7 sc(t-q))d7fc(t;q) Jo 
Here, diC(p) is the partial derivative of C with respect to Pi evaluated at p. 
It is clear from (1) that the path relevant to an agent is independent of higher 
demands. Thus, the cost shares of agents are unaffected by small changes in the 
17A strategy S; for agent i is overwhelmed by strategy Sj with respect to if the best that 
agent i can get over S_ l by playing Sj is worse than the worst that he gets by playing §i. 
18Notice that this is stronger property than solvability in elimination of dominated strategies. 
19SC in the symbol underlines the point that this path corresponds to the generalization of Serial 
Cost (SC) sharing rule. 
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demands of higher demanding agents. Therefore, the externality is one sided (and 
thus, acyclic). Intuitively, due to this reason this mechanism enjoys nice strategic 
properties that we will see in Theorem 1.1. Moreover, due the same reason, the nice 
strategic properties are preserved if the "f s c is replaced by any arbitrary continuous 
non-decreasing path <j>(t;C)Aq, where 4> satisfies the following properties. For fixed 
C, (f) is non-decreasing and continuous in t with 0(0; C) = 0 and l i m ^ ^ <^(i; C) 
> gmax for all i. See figure 1.3 below for an example of such a <fi. 
This liberty of choosing the 4> gives rise to a huge class of cost sharing methods 
called Fixed Path Methods (FPM). There is a FPM corresponding to each fixed 
Figure 1.3. Fixed path method in two agent case 
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path 4> which can be defined as follows 
J/»oo 
' diC(<P(t;C)Ag)d(Mt;C)Agi) 
o 
These are called fixed path methods because the path <f>, which does not depend 
on q and thus, axe in a sense fixed, uniquely defines a method. One example of 
a fixed path is the path which follows the the edges of the rectangle [O.g] in some 
predecided order and this leads to the incremental methods. Notice that when 
cost function is symmetric or when 4> is independent of the cost function then 
the only symmetric FPM is the Friedman-Moulin method (1) defined by the path 
which is the diagonal of the positive orthant. Leroux [18] provides a justification 
of non-symmetric paths. However, symmetry is trivially satisfied when the cost 
function is not symmetric and we allow 0 to be a function of C. This gives rise 
to a huge class of symmetric methods. Clearly, we will be sacrificing additivity in 
most of the cases but we can recover scale invariance and even stronger properties 
like ordinality20 ( see Sprumont [28] ). The path which most closely follows the 
spirit of serial method is the path which defines Moulin-Shenker ordinal method 
discussed in ( Sprumont [28] ). This path which we will call <f)MS is defined by the 
solution of the following differential equation 
d<l>fIS(t]C)/dt=l/diC((f>MS(t]C)) 
20Ordinality is a stronger requirement than scale invariance. Scale invariance requires that the 
cost shares should be invariant to linear transformation of the demand profile whereas ordinality 
requires that it should be invariant to any arbitrary monotonic transformations, possibily non 
linear. 
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satisfying the boundary condition <j)MS(0; C) = 0. This path has the property that 
on any point on the path the incremental cost generated by a small move along 
the path is shared equally among the agents not fully served. Other examples of 
FPMs can be generated by applying a FPM to any suitably normalized problem 
e.g. applying FPM to axially normalized problem ( Friedman [7] ). One seemingly 
natural FPM thus generated discussed in Friedman [7] is the use of diagonal path 
after axial normalization of the problem. 
Given the set of agents N, utility profile u = {ui}ieN, a cost function C, a 
fixed path method •) induces a cost sharing game r(x, u) . These induced 
games have variety of strategic properties: uniqueness of NE, Strong Equilibria, 
uniqueness of set of rationalizable outcomes and convergence of adaptive learners. 
Friedman [7] shows these properties for fixed path methods by showing that the 
induced games are O-Solvable which in turn implies all these properties. 
Theorem 1.1. (Friedman [7]^ : Assume that the marginal cost (•diC(q)) is 
strictly increasing in all variables, xf (•; •) is a fixed path method and that pref-
erences, ul(ql, xt) are increasing in qi, decreasing in xl} and concave. Then the 
induced game is O-solvable. 
It should be noted that there can be paths which depends on q and we can use 
such paths to define "path methods" in a similar fashion as (3). One prominent 
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example of such a path method is the Auman-Shapley method where the path 
is the ray joining the origin to the demand vector, thus for each demand there 
corresponds a path. More precisely, the path which generates the Aumann-Shapley 
method is given by 4>AS{t\ C)(q) = tq. We notice that this path is not a fixed path 
and the demand game generated by this method does not share the appealing 
strategic properties that is enjoyed by the FPMs. The Aumann-Shapley method 
in the homogeneous goods case is the proportional method. It has been shown in 
Watts [30] (see also Moulin [20] for detailed analyses ) that uniqueness of NE is 
not guaranteed in the proportional demand games for general convex preferences 
and a sufficient condition has been shown to be the binormality of preferences. 
Moreover, as we will discuss in next section, even when the NE is unique this 
method doesn't share the strategic properties of that of the FPMs. Intuitively, this 
happens because a change in the demand by any agent changes the cost shares of 
all the agents. For more on such path methods and axiomatic characterization of 
methods generated by paths and more generally by convex combinations of paths 
please refer to Friedman and Moulin [9], 
1.4. Serial SCF and generalized serial SCF 
We mentioned in the last section that if the production technology has increas-
ing marginal costs and the preferences are convex then the serial rule (1) defined in 
the homogeneous goods case induces a game which admits a unique NE. A serial 
21 
social choice function (SCF) for a fixed cost function C associates this unique NE 
allocation to the preference profile generating this game. 
Figure 1.4. Serial SCF in two agent case 
Figure 1.4 above demonstrates the Serial mechanism (SCF) in two individual 
and two good economy where one good x is the input (x-axis) and the other good 
q is output (y-axis). The production technology is decreasing returns to scale i.e. 
the cost function is convex. The blue curve is c(q), red one is c(2q)/2 and the 
black one coincides with the red one till point A and then goes parallel to blue 
curve. More precisely, the black curve has two parts. The part below A is the 
locus of points that are 1/2 of some point on the blue curve. The part above A is 
the locus of points whose vector sum to the point A belongs to the blue curve. The 
high valuation agent (H) is the agent whose MRS is higher for the output with 
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respect to the input. The other agent is the low valuation agent (L). The agents 
are required to report their utility functions and allocation is assigned according to 
the Serial cost sharing rule. More details on the algorithm to implement the serial 
SCF can be found in Moulin and Shenker [17]. The purpose of bringing the 2X2 
case of Serial SCF here is that the Generalized Serial SCF is defined very closely 
in the spirit of Serial mechanism here. The three conditions below in the definition 
of generalized serial functions are linked to the following three observation in the 
above picture. 
1) The opportunity set of L remains unaffected by change in the preferences of 
H as long as H has higher valuation than L. 
2) Owing to the convexity of production function and the preferences, there is 
a unique maximizer point A for L on his opportunity set given H and also B for H 
on her opportunity set given L. 
3) Owing to no kinks in red and black curve at A, A remains the optimum 
point for L even after small changes in preference by H. 
1.4.1. Generalized Serial Mechanism (SCF): 
The generalized serial SCF is defined for an economy with n agents and m goods 
where n and m are greater than 1. Production technology P is a m—p dimensional 
smooth manifold which represents a technology where out of m-goods, p are inputs 
and m-p are outputs. Set of alternatives A is the set of allocation to the agents in 
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N which is feasible under P. More formally, A = {x e -R+n|(XT=i x») e p}- 0ne 
example of such set of alternatives where m = 2 and p = 1 is the set of allocations 
for the two agents in the above example which add up the a point which lie on the 
blue curve in figure 4. The set of admissible utility functions Ui for agent i contains 
the functions Ui : Rm —> R that are continuous, non-decreasing in all dimensions, 
locally non satiated and quasi-concave. Linear utilities of agent i is the subset L 
of Ui which isomorphic to R™ — {0m}. 
Definition 1.5 (Generalized Serial Function (Shenker) [26]). Consider a func-
tion a: R™^ A st., \/z e R$ and VA € L : 
(1) Zi < zj ai(z) = ai(z_j, Sj),\/Sj € [zi} oo], 
(2)X.ai(z_i,Si) has a unique maximizer si, Vi 
(3)If~si is the unique maximizer of A.Gj(z_j, s,) thenJi is also the unique max-
imizer of X.a^z'^, s^ Mz' st., Vj ^ i, MIN[z'j}Zj] <si^Zj = Zj. 
Such a function "a " is called a "generalized serial function " 
Let's denote by F the set of all generalized serial functions. For a given utility 
profile u a function a e F induces the normal form game T(a; u) = (N, Vi; St = R+) {ui(ai(-)}i£N)} 
where N is the set of players, R+ is the strategy space for all players and the payoff 
function for player i is given by Ui o Oj(-). Such games possess unique NE. 
Lemma 1.1. : \/u G U,Va E F\ T(a; u) has a unique NE. 
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Proof. The proof consists of two steps. In first step it is shown that there can not 
be more than one NE and then an explicit algorithm is given to construct a NE. 
A formal proof can be found in Appendix A.l below. • 
Definition 1.6 (Generalized Serial Mechanism). £a is a generalized serial 
mechanism (GSS) associated with a € F if (a(u) = a(z) where z is the unique 
NE of T(a; u). 
Let's denote by G the set of all generalized serial mechanisms. 
1.5. Secure implementability of Generalized Serial Mechanisms and 
the fixed path mechanisms 
Now we are ready to present our main result which encompasses the result of 
Saijo et al. [25] 
Theorem 1.2. Any generalized serial mechanism (GSS) is securely imple-
mentable. 
Proof. We show the secure implementabilty of GSS by showing that the GSS are 
strategyproof and that they satisfy the rectangularity property. Then by propo-
sition 1 the desired result follows. Please refer to the Appendix A.2 below for a 
complete proof. • 
Now we define a class of social choice functions called fixed path social choice 
functions based on fixed path cost sharing rules. Let's assume the conditions on 
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the cost function and the preferences that were used in theorem 1.1. Then from the 
theorem 1.1 we know that there will be unique NE in the game induced 
by the the cost sharing rule x* based on the fixed path 4>. 
Definition 1.7. A fixed path social choice function associates the allocation 
corresponding to the unique NE of the game u) to the preference profile u. 
The following theorem states that all such fixed path SCF are securely imple-
mentable. 
Theorem 1.3. Under the assumptions of theorem 1.1, a fixed path social choice 
function is a special case of generalized serial social choice function and thus 
are securely implementable. 
Proof. The proof consists of explicitly constructing a generalized serial function 
"a" for every fixed path social choice function ^ . We use two lemmas for proving 
the desired properties of such "a". Please refer to Appendix A.3 below for a 
comprehensive proof. • 
At this time we would like to emphasize that the SCFs corresponding to path 
methods other than fixed path methods may not be securely implementable. One 
such method as we discussed above is the Aumann-Shapley method which cor-
responds to the proportional method in the homogeneous goods case. To ensure 
the uniqueness of NE in the demand game lets consider linear utilities (which are 
obviously binormal) given by uz(qi, x2) = b ^ — Xi and convex cost technology given 
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by c(y) = y2/2. Proportional cost shares are given by xf~(q) = ^c(qx), where 
qN = YlieN <7*-Let's define the proportional SCF £z?r which associates to every 
utility profile u the unique NE of the demand game T(xpr,u). We notice that 
this SCF is not securely implementable. As a matter of fact these are not even 
strategyproof. To see this consider a two agent situation. Let the linear utilities 
of agents 1 and 2 be defined by the parameters b\ and b2. Then, whenever bi s 
are close enough to ensure the active participation of both agents, the unique NE 
demand profile (ql,q2) is given by q* = | — y ) and the equilibrium cost shares 
turn out to be Xi = |(bi — y) + \bj(bi — i,j £ {1,2}. Therefore, the optimal 
report b* of agent i with true parameter hl is given by b* = + 1 bj where b3 is the 
report of agent j . Clearly, there are profitable manipulation of reports by agents. 
In particular, suppose bi = b2 = b and agent 1 reports truthfully then the optimal 
report of agent 2 is ^fe. 
We see that the FPMs are special case of GSS. However, there are GSS which 
can not be represented by FPM. One trivial example is a constant SCF. There-
fore we conclude that GSS are more general than FPMs and have nice strategic 
properties.. 
We conclude by the following conjecture which we leave for future work. 
Conjecture 1.1. Every smooth, nonconstant, anonymous and securely imple-
mentable scf is an element of G. 
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A Proofs 
A . l Proof of lemma 1.1 
Step 1- Given any u G U and any a G F; r(a; u) can not have more than one 
NE. 
Proof: Let z and zl be two distinct NE with z = z<i, ...., zn) and zt — 
(zti,z'2, z'3, ....,z'n) . 
There must exist an element i such that z^ / z\ and m in { z j ,Z j } < min{zi,z-} = 
Zj = Z'j. 
Without loss of generality, say z'{ < z,. But then z\ = argmax Ui(ai(s, z_i)) = 
s e [ o , i ] 
Zi which is a contradiction. 
Step 2- Given any u € U and any a(z) G F; The following algorithm generates 
a profile 2 which is a (the) NE of T(a; u). 
Algorithm: 
1)Set z=(l,l,....,l). 
2) Define s} = argmax u^a^s, z_j)),Vi. 
S€[0,1] 
3) Without loss of generality, let s} = min{s}}. Set z\ = s] and leave the other 
i 
elements of z unchanged. 
4) Define sf = argmax U{(ai(s, z_j)),Vi. 
se[0,i] 
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5)Without loss of generality, let s\ = min{sj}. Set z2 = s\ and leave the other i^l 
elements of z unchanged. 
6)Repeat the process to update £3,-2:4, ,zn. 
Claim: The profile z obtained by the above algorithm is a NE of P(a; u). 
Proof: 
Claim l.If s\ < sj+J for all i = l,2,...n-l, then z is a NE. 
Proof: Straightforward from property 3 and the way z has been constructed. 
Claim2. s\ < sj+J for all i = l,2,...n-l 
Proof: 
Partl-sJ < s\. This holds because, = s} = zx (because 1 is solving the same 
optimization exercise) and s^ < s{ = > s\ = 52 which contradicts the definition 
of sj. 
Part2- If s\ < sj+J for all z < k then < . 
Proof: Notice first that sf = zi — s\ for all I < k. This is true because of 
condition 3. Now < =>• s^+l = s£+1 which contradicts the definition of 
A.2 Proof of theorem 1.2 
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Strategyproofness of GSS follows from Theorem 7.2.3 in Dasgupta et al. [6], 
given our domain of preferences being monotonically closed and the fact that GSS 
is a single valued Nash Implementable SCF. 
We will prove the Rectangularity Property: 
Vu,u G U ; to(C°(S)) = U i i C i u ^ U - i ) ) V i e N = > C(u) = C » } 
Proof: 
Fix an arbitrary pair of utility profiles u, u G U 
Let Ui(Ca(£)) = Ui(C{ui,u-i)) M i e N 
Define, NE(T{a] uu = F; NE{r(a\u)) = 5 ; NE(T(a-,u)) = z. (Notice 
the notation; z% is a vector and Zi is the i'th component of the vector z. For 
example, 2^is the k'th component of z \ ) 
Stepl: z1 = z , Vie N. 
Proof: Let zl z for some i. 
Now, we must have an element k st. z\ ^ zkand min{Sj,Zj} < min{i£, zk} 
z) = Zj. 
Casel: k ^ i 
Without loss of generality, say, zk < zk. 
z\ = argmax uk(ak(s, zl_k)) = argmax uk(ak(s,z_k)) = which is a con-
se[o,i] se[o,i] tradiction. 
Case2: k = i 
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Here there are two relevant cases, 
Case2.1: zj < % 
Then we have, 
z\ = argmax Ui(a,i(s, z1^)) — argmax Ui(ai(s,z_i)) 
ae[o,i] . se[o,i] 
From property 1 in the definition of a, we must have the following 
ai(2i,zLi) = Oi(zl,z-i) 
or, Oi(^) = ai(zl,z_i) 
=>• Ui(ai(z1)) = Ui(ai(zl,z-i)) 
We also know, = ui((a(ui,u-i)) \/i E N 
or, Ui{a{z)) = Uiiafi)) , Vt 6 N. 
or, Ui(ai(z)) = Ui(ai(z1)), Vi € N. 
Therefore, u^a^z)) - u^a^z}, £_;)) 
In other words, u ^ a ^ , = -u^a^i-, 
But then, z\ = because SJis unique maximizer of ul(al(s, and uj^ajs, iL;)). 
Case2.2: > 
From property 1 in the definition of a, we must have the following 
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Cii(zi,z-i) = ai(5i,zLi) 
or, ai(z) = ai(zi,z%_i) 
We also know, Ui(ai(z)) = u^a^P) ) , Vi G iV. 
Therefore we have, 
Ui(oi(F)) = ^ ( ^ ( z i . S L j ) 
But then, z? = because 2 J is unique maximizer of iij(aj(s, iP^)) and u^a^s , z_j)). 
• 
Notice, the above step establishes the following property : 
Ui(a,i(s,Z-i)) and Ui(a,i(s,Z-i)) both are maximized at z; = z-for all i —A 
Step 2: 
C ( u ) = O ) 
Proof: 
Proving a(z) = a(z) should be enough since, by definition ( a(u) = ( a(u) 
a(z) = a(z). 
In fact, we will prove a stronger property, namely, z = z. 
Suppose not and let z z . 
Now, we must have an element k st. z* ^ Zf-cind m in{z j , z f \ < min{zfc, zk} = > 
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There can be two cases, 
Case 1. Zk > Zk 
Then we get the following expression, where first and fourth equalities are 
from definition, second follows from the 4 and third is due to the property 3 in 
the definition of function "a" 
zk = argmax uk{ak{s, z_k)) — argmax uk(ak(s,z_k)) = argmax uk(ak(s,z_k)) = 
s€[o,i] se[o,i] se[o,i] 
zk and we reach a contradiction. 
Case 2. zk < zk 
Then we get the following expression, where first and fourth equalities are 
from definition, third follows from the 4 and second is due to the property 3 in 
the definition of function "a" 
zk = argmax uk(ak(s, z_fc)) = argmax uk(ak(s,z_k)) — argmax uk(ak(s,z-k)) = 
se[o,i] se[0,i] se[o,i] 
zk and we hit another contradiction to conclude the proof. 
• 
A.3 Proof of theorem 1.3 
We first present two lemmas which will be the key to the proof of theorem 3 
below. 
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Lemma 1.2. ( Lemma 1 in Friedman [7] ): Assume that marginal cost is 
strictly increasing in all variables and that xf (•; •) is a fixed path method. Define 
Zi(qi) = min[t|<^(2) > ql). Then: 
(a) xf(q; C) is strictly increasing and strictly convex in qi. 
(b) xf(q\ C) is non decreasing in qj for all j ^ i. 
(c) For all q and qj such that both Zj(qj) and Zj{q3) > Zi(qi) then xf(q-,C) = 
xt{l-iAj\C). 
Lemma 1.3. (Lemma 2 in Moulin & Shenker [17] ): Let h1(X),h2(X) be 
two increasing and strictly convex functions from R+ onto itself that coincide up 
to Ao-' 
hi(X) = h2{X) for all X, 0 < X < XQ 
Then for every utility function Ui in Ui, the (unique) maximizers of Ui(hf.(X), X) 
on R+, denoted by Xk, k = 1,2 are on the same side of Ao: 
X\> Ag A2> Ao, AI= AO Ao. 
Proof of theorem: 
Fix a cost function C satisfying the assumptions of theorem 1.1. Let the do-
main of utility functions representing the preferences satisfying the assumptions 
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be U. Let the the set of alternatives be A = {(q,x) : q G [0, qr1""*]^ , x G R+ and 
=
 C(<?)}-Consider a fixed path <f> and the associated fixed path social 
choice function f1* : U —> A which allocates the outcome corresponding to the 
unique NE of T(x<t>,u) to the preference profile u. Consider Di = {0} U {t G R+\ 
<j>'i(t)- is positive}21 and ^(g,) = min[t|0;(i) > <&] (see figure 3 above for such 
an example of Zj). We claim that a function a : xieNDt —> A which is defined 
as follows is a generalized serial function and the associated generalized serial 
SCF C° = Let ai(z) = (qi(z),xf(q(z))) for all i, where
 qi{z) = ^(z,) and 
q(z) = {<f>i(zi), 4>2{z2),4>n(zn))- We will now prove the following three proper-
ties of a using lemma 1.2 and lemma 1.3 above and the assumption on preferences. 
Vz e xi€NDi and VA G L : 
(1 )zi < Zj =*> ai(z) = a ^ z - ^ s ^ y s j G [z;,oo], 
(2)A.aj(z_i, Sj) has a unique maximizer si, Vi 
(3)If si is the unique maximizer of A.a;(z_;, Sj) then s~ is also the unique max-
imizer of A.a;(z!_i, Si) Vz' St., V? ^ i, MINlz^zj] < si => zj = Zj 
First thing to notice is that even though the domain of "a" is not the same as in 
the original definition, the properties of "a" is retained exactly. This is so because 
for all i, the Di is order-isomorphic to R+ given Dl is concatenation of open-closed 
intervals with "0" included. Now we will show the above three properties one 
by one. To see that property 1 is true, notice that z* uniquely defines ql{z) — 
<j>i(zi) which is independent of z_j. Also, part (c) of the lemma 1.2 implies that 
214>'i{t)- is the left hand derivative of (j)i at t. 
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xf(q(z)) = xf(q(z)) Mz' st., Vj ^ i, MIN[z'j, zj] < si =» z'j =
 Zj. Property 2 is 
a consequence of part (a) of lemma 1.1 and the linearity of preferences. We first 
notice that strict convexity of xf (q~, C) in ^ and linearity of preferences which are 
increasing in qi and decreasing in xl ensures a unique maximizer q*. But then, 
there will a unique z* for this q* by the definition of Property 3 is a bit 
more subtle and the proof is as follows. Consider two points z and z' in x i e NDi. 
Consider a coordinate i. Let, Vj ^ i, MIN[z'j, Zj] < si z'j = Zj. Consider 
A G {R+ x il_}/{0}. Let Si = a r g m a x A . a - i S j ) and Si = argmaxA.a^^j,Si). 
SiGDi Si£Di 
Let's call {aj(z_i, Si)}jGN = {(qj, Xj)}jeJV and {aj{z'_i,Si)}j€N = {(£,•, x^Jiejv. 
Prom part (c) of lemma 1.2 we know xf(q_i, qi] C) & xf(q-i,qi;C) coincide for 
all q% G [0,qi\. Also, we know from part (b) of lemma 2 that xf(q_i,-\C) & 
xf(q_i, •; C) both are strictly convex in ql. By the definition of s% it follows that 
qi — arg max A - {qt , xf(q_i, q^ C)). But then from lemma 1.3 we must have qi = qi. 
Finally to conclude the proof we notice, qi being one to one function of zl implies 
that Si = Sj. Also the way we have defined ( a and ^ , they coincide. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Implementing Efficient Graphs in Connection Networks 
2.1. Introduction 
We consider the problem of sharing the cost of a congestion-free network which 
meets the connection demands of a set of agents. The agents simultaneously choose 
a path in the network connecting the demand nodes of the agents, and a mech-
anism splits the total cost of the network formed among the participants. This 
type of problem arises in many contexts ranging from water distribution systems, 
road networks, telecommunications services and multicast transmission to large 
computer networks such as Internet. 
The Shapley Mechanism ([3]), which divides the cost of every edge equally 
among its users, has become focal in this setup. Even though Shapley looks a 
natural mechanism in this setting, there are serious problems associated with it 
which we discuss as following. First, this method may provide wrong incentives to 
the players and they may end up choosing an inefficient graph in equilibrium. In-
deed, consider the network in figure 2.1 right. The equilibrium under the Shapley 
mechanism is (st1, st2) which has a total cost equal to 2, whereas the efficient con-
nection network has cost equal to | + e. Even the best equilibrium can be as costly 
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Figure 2.1. Symmetric networks with a common source and two sinks 
as H(k) = 1 + 2 + ' ' ' + 1 times the cost of optimal graph, where k is the number of 
users ([2]). Next issue with Shapley mechanism is its asymmetry at equilibrium. 
Even though the mechanism is symmetric, at equilibrium it may charge different 
amounts to agents who are in exactly symmetric situations before the choice of 
paths by the agents. To see this problem, consider the symmetric network for two 
agents with common sources and two sinks depicted in the left panel of figure 2.1. 
Here, the Nash equilibria of the Shapley mechanism are (sti,stit2) or (si2ti, st2). 
Thus agents pay either 1 — e) or (1 — e, depending on the equilibrium. Hence, 
even though the network is symmetric, agents pay different costs at equilibrium 
under the Shapley mechanism. This example also points to the multiplicity of 
equilibria and thus the problem of equilibrium selection. Next major concern with 
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this mechanism is that they are not continuous in the network structure. The 
mechanism is very discontinuous and hence unstable: the two networks in figure 
2.1 can be arbitrarily close under any measure, whereas the equilibriums will be ar-
bitrarily different under the Shapley mechanism. Continuity is also desirable since 
unavoidable measurement errors in practical life may lead to very unfair outcomes. 
Finally, we notice that the amount of information needed for Shapley mech-
anism may not be practical in many settings. The Shapley mechanism needs as 
input the paths chosen by each agent. This information can be out of reach in 
many settings. Consider for instance the network of roads in a state, district or 
a country to be financed by the users of the roads. The procurement of the in-
formation on exact paths used by the drivers needs the compulsory installment 
of GPS (Global Positioning System) in all the vehicles and the data to be stored 
and updated by a central taxing authority. Due to privacy issues this may not 
be possible politically (see for example [10]). However, tax based on the number 
of miles driven can be implemented without raising that much privacy concerns. 
Road maintenance taxes, based on the miles driven by every user have been used 
in pilot programs in Oregon since January 2009, and other states like Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, Colorado, Florida, Rhode Island, Minnesota and Texas are considering 
them (see [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]). This kind of environment requires mechanisms 
where the input is the total cost of the paths used by the agents rather than the 
path itself. Moreover, in spite of the information on the paths being available, it 
may sometimes be desirable to use just the total costs of the paths rather than 
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the paths itself. Consider, for instance a big or highly dynamic network structure, 
where agents join and leave the network continuously. It may be impractical to 
change the formulae of our mechanism every time the network changes. One such 
example is sharing the cost of a telephone network or Internet where the agree-
ment is generally monthly but there are agents coming in and leaving the network 
continuously. Notice that, long distance calls being charged the same makes sense 
irrespective of number of users who share the edges1. There are normative concerns 
too for charging the agents who may not be responsible for their links not being 
shared by a lot users. Examples are electricity/water supply or postal services to 
remote villages. 
This type of setting demands a new framework which is easy to implement in 
such settings where the inputs of the mechanism are only the total cost of the 
agents demand and the total cost of the network formed. This type of problem re-
sembles the classic bankruptcy problem (also referred in the literature as rationing 
or taxation problem), where a given amount of resources (e.g., money) must be 
divided among beneficiaries with unequal claims on the resources (see [18] [20] for 
detailed surveys about the problem). 
1The choice of path is not a strategy for the telephone user and thus the setting is not exactly 
the same but the cost-sharing method has a similar motivation, namely its simpler than charging 
every caller differently based on the path used. 
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2.1.1. Overview of the results 
We propose mechanisms which implement the efficient graph in a centralized com-
munication network. Our definition of implementation is weaker than that of 
full implementation. More precisely, we say that an outcome is implemented by a 
mechanism when that outcome is " a" Nash Equilibrium (NE) in the game induced 
by the mechanism. We also provide an equilibrium selection rule when multiplicity 
of equilibria exists. We require the implemented graph to Pareto dominate any 
other graph which is an equilibrium under that mechanism, whenever possible. 
The main contribution of the paper is the characterization of mechanisms which 
implements the efficient graph under such robust equilibria. It turns out that the 
mechanisms monotonic in total cost, which admits efficient graph as equilibrium 
and Pareto dominating other equilibrium graphs, also admits efficient graph as a 
strong equilibrium (Theorem 2.1). We also give a characterization of the average 
cost mechanism (AC) ([IT] [13]) which divides the total cost of the network equally 
among its participants (Theorem 2.2). 
The main downplay of AC is that it does not meet individual rationality (IR, 
also referred in the literature as voluntary participation): agents demanding cheap 
links may pay more than the cost of their demands, thus they may subsidize 
agents who demand expensive links. We show that there is no efficient rule that is 
compatible with IR (Theorem 2.3i). However, we find out that the egalitarian rule 
(EG), a rule reminiscent to the AC that meets IR, always possesses a pure strategy 
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NE and satisfies IR. EG is optimum across all rules meeting IR under the Price of 
Stability measure (PoS),2 the traditional inefficiency measure used in this literature 
(see [3]). EG is no more wasteful than the Shapley mechanism. It has a price if 
stability equal to H(k) = 1 + | + • • • + where k is the number of agents in the 
network3 (Theorem 2.3M). This is remarkable since, as we have discussed before, 
EG requires much less information than Sh. Finally, the proportional method, a 
seemingly natural method in this framework, also admits a pure strategy NE but 
is far more inefficient than the egalitarian rule (Theorem 2 . 3 m ) . 
2.1.2. Related literature 
The performance of Sh have been widely studied in recent literature. [3] studies the 
equilibrium behavior of separable mechanisms, a class of decentralized mechanisms 
that divides the cost of each edge among its users. The PoS of separable mecha-
nisms with linear cost-sharing function is at least H(k) (which is O(logfc)), where 
k is the number of agents [3]. H(k) is also also the upper bound on PoS(Sh) in gen-
eral graphs [2], thus Sh is optimal among linear separable mechanisms. PoS(Sh) 
is achieved in directed graphs. If the graph is undirected, PoS(Sh) is lower than 
H(k). [1] finds a new upper bound of O(log log k) when the graph is single source 
2
 PoS is computed by finding the maximum of the ratio of the best Nash equilibrium and the 
efficient graph over all problems. 
3An alternative measure is the price of anarchy (PoA). PoA is computed similarly to PoS, but 
using the worst Nash equilibrium instead of the best. EG and Sh are also equally inefficient 
under PoA. Both rules have a PoA equal to k. However, PoA is not informative since any other 
symmetric rule has the same PoA. 
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and there are no steiner nodes. [11] finds a new upper bound of O (log k/ log log k) 
for single source networks when steiner nodes are allowed. [3] shows that the upper 
bound in two player case with single source is As it turns out, the PoS is | even 
when there are two sources and two sinks. We provide a poof of this claim (claim 
2.1) in the section 2.6.1. 
2.2. The model 
We fix the number of agents K = {1,2,. ..,&}. A network cost-sharing prob-
lem is a tuple N =< G,K >, where G = (V, E) is a network which is a di-
rected or undirected such that each edge e £ E has a non negative cost ce. 
K = {{si,t1},{s2,t2},...,{sk,tk}}, where {suti} E 2V for all i E K, is the 
set of sources and sinks that agents want to connect. When there is no confusion, 
we also denote K = K the set of agents. Let the set of all graphs be G, and the 
set of all network cost-sharing problems be denoted by N. 
Given a problem N E N, a strategy for agent i is a path Pi C E which connects 
Si to ti. Let the set of paths connecting s, to i, be Ui(N). Let U{N) = x IIj(AQ 
ie.K 
is the set of strategy profiles of all agents in network N. P = {P,}f=1 E U(N) will 
be used to denote a strategy profile of the agents. When there is no confusion we 
denote ni(Ar) and II(iV) simply as 11; and II respectively. Let GP = ( U_ Pi), the i€K 
network formed by the choice of paths by different agents. Let C(P) = ^ e e G p ( c e ) 
the cost of the graph formed by strategies P. 
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Let J\f = U/v£N-P(Ar) x N the union of all problems with their respective 
strategies. 
Definition 2.1. A cost-sharing mechanism is a mapping xp : H —> K+ suc^ 
that 
E N ) = ° ( p ) f°r al1 N ) e 
i£K 
A cost-sharing mechanism assigns non-negative cost-shares to the users of the 
network based on their demands such that the total cost of the network formed is 
exactly collected. 
Example 2.1. • The Shapley mechanism, Sh, divides the cost of every 
link equally across it users, that is Shi(P, N) = u(e'p) for ^ £ 
where U(e, P) is the number of users of link e in the strategy profile P. 
• The proportional to stand-alone mechanism, r f , divides the cost of the 
network in proportion to every user's stand-alone cost. That is, rj^~(P, N) = 
sa^n^+saun)0^) for a l 1 1 e K, where SA^N) = mmPi^n{N) C(P;) is 
the stand alone of agent i in network N. 
• The Average cost mechanism AC divides the cost of the network formed 
equally across all users. That is ACi(P, N) — for all i £ K. 
The Shapley mechanism is a separable mechanism, that is it divides the cost 
of every link only across its users, and adds those costs for all links in the net-
work formed. Alternative separable mechanisms can be constructed by considering 
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different cost-sharing rules for the links, for instance by giving priority across all 
users. Nevertheless, Sh is the optimal mechanism (using the price of stability 
measure, see below) across all separable mechanism ([3]). Sh can be computed in 
polynomial time. 
On the other hand, if7" divides the cost of the network in proportion to the 
stand alone of the agents. Since the stand-alone of every agent has to be computed 
for every network, this mechanism uses the full information of the network. 
AC divides the cost of the network formed equally across the users of the 
network. It is the most egalitarian rule, reminiscent to the classic head tax rule 
where the size of the demands of the agents is not important, only the size of the 
total cost of the network formed. AC uses less information than Sh or r f , since 
only the total cost of the network formed and the number of agents is needed to 
compute the cost-sharing allocation. There is no need to know the stand-alone of 
the agents, or the users of certain links. As such, its computation complexity is 
minimal. 
Definition 2.2. A cost-sharing mechanism ip is network independent if for 
any two problems N =< G,K > and N' =< G',K' > and strategies P G P{N) 
and P' G P(N') such that C(Pi) = C(P?) for all i G K and C{P) = C(P'): 
<p(P,N) = <p(P',N'). 
Network independence captures those mechanisms that only depend on the cost 
of the network being formed and the cost of the demands of the agents. Neither 
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Sh nor j f are network independent. On the other hand, AC only uses the total 
cost of the network and the number of users, thus it is network independent. More 
complex network independent mechanism are discussed below. 
Let Sk = {(c; y) G R+ x R* | max;
 Vi < c < Vi}. 
Lemma 2.1. A cost-sharing mechanism ip is network independent if and only if 
there is a unique function £ : Sk —»R* such that J2i £i(ci v) — c for (c! y) € «Sfc, 
and 
<P(p,N) = ac(py,c(p1),...,c(Pk)) 
for all problems (P, N) G Af. 
Proof. The sufficient part is obvious. We prove the necessity only. 
First, for any (c; y) G Sk we construct the network 7V(c; y) as follows 
without loss of generality that y\ > y2 > • • • > yk- Choose i, i G {1,.. 
that: 
yi + V2 H H yi < c < yi + y2 h y i+x. 
Let iV(c; y) be a linear network such that every agent has a unique strategy. 
All agents 1 to i have demand yl that do not intersect. Agent i + 1 has demand 
2/i+i such that a segment of length c — (yi -+- y2 + • • • + does not intersect the 
other agents, and yi + y2 + • • • + yi+i — c intersects the other agents. Agent j, 
j > i + 1 has demand yj contained on the demands of the agents { l , . . . , i + l}. 
. Assume 
. k} such 
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Clearly, the unique strategy of agent k in N(c; y) is yk, and the network formed 
by all strategies has cost c. Define £ : Sk —* M+ as £(c; y) = ip(N(c\ y)). 
Second, consider any arbitrary network N =< G, K > and a set of demands 
P. On one hand, notice that C(P) > C(Pi) for every agent i, since Pi C P. On the 
other hand, notice that C{P) < C{PX) + • • • + C(Pk), since P C f \ U P2 U • • • U Pk. 
Let yi = C(Pi) and c = C(P). Then (c; y) 6 Sk. By network independence: 
cp{P,N) = ip(N(c\y)) = y). The uniqueness of £ follows because it is well 
defined on <5fc. • 
Notice a network independent mechanism is reduced to the function £ that 
is similar to a taxation (rationing, bankruptcy) solution ([20, 18]). Since we 
only work on mechanisms that are network independent, we refer without loss of 
generality to the function £ as a mechanism. We describe below some desirable 
properties on the function 
Definition 2.3. A mechanism is continuous if the function £ : Sk —> is a 
continuous function with the Euclidean distance. 
Continuous mechanisms capture the fact that small perturbations on the de-
mand or cost of the network should not change the total allocation of the cost. 
All the network independent mechanism described in this paper meet continuity. 
Continuity is used on all the result without referring to it. 
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Given a problem N =< G,K >, we say P* is an efficient graph if P* G 
argminC(P). That is, P* is a graph that connects all the agents at a minimal 
pen(iv) 
cost. 
Given the problem N =< G, K >, the mechanism £ induces the following non-
cooperative game T*(N) = < K, {Tli(N)}ie^, >> where the representation 
of the game is the standard representation of game in normal form. Namely, 
K = {1 , . . . , k] is the set of players, Tli(N) is the strategy space of player i, and 
is the (negative of) payoff function of player i which maps a strategy profile to 
real numbers. 
P is a Nash Equilibrium (NE) of r5(7V), if Pi G arg m i n ^ A , for all i. Let AeiMiv) 
NE(T^(N)) = {Pe U(N)\P is a Nash Equilibrium of T^N)} 
be the set of Nash equilibriums of the game r^(iV). 
We say that £ (weakly) implements P, if P G NE(Ti(N)). 
Definition 2.4. The mechanism £ is efficient (EFF) if it implements an effi-
cient graph for any problem N, that is P* G NE(T*(N)) for some efficient graph 
P*. 
The definition of efficiency just requires an efficient graph to be selected as a 
Nash equilibrium. This does not preclude other equilibriums to be selected. 
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Notice AC is efficient. Indeed, at any strategy profile P* that implements an 
efficient graph every agent is paying ° ^ \ If an agent i deviates from P* to Pi, 
then he will pay C { P i f U ) . Clearly, > by the optimality of P*. 
Definition 2.5. The mechanism £ Pareto Nash Implements (PNI) an efficient 
graph if for any problem N, it implements an efficient graph and that graph Pareto 
dominates any other equilibrium. That is, for any problem N: 
• There is an efficient graph P* such that P* G NE(T^(N)), and 
• For any other P G NE(T^(N)) : £(P*) < £(P). 
PNI is a very robust property that guarantees the efficient allocation is selected 
even when multiplicity of equilibria arise. In the case of multiplicity of equilibria, 
PNI guarantees that all agents would prefer the efficient graph to any other equi-
librium. Hence, multiplicity of equilibria is not an issue. 
In particular, this guarantees that whenever there are multiplicity of equilibria 
such that agent i prefers equilibrium Pl to P3, and agent j prefers equilibrium P3 
to P\ there should exist another equilibrium P* (the efficient equilibrium) such 
that agent i prefers equilibrium P* to P% and agent j also prefers equilibrium P* 
to Pj. 
The AC mechanism is also PNI. Indeed, at the efficient graph P*, this equilib-
rium would Pareto dominate any other equilibrium P since c ^ ^ < ^jp-. 
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Definition 2.6. The mechanism £ Strongly Nash Implements (SNI) an effi-
cient graph if for any problem N it implements an efficient graph in strong Nash 
equilibrium. That is for any problem N, 
• There is an efficient graph P* such that P* G NE(T^(N)), and 
• for any group of agents S C { 1 , . . . , k}, and P G n ( iV) such that P_s = 
P-S, if UP) > UP*) for some i G S, then ^(P) < ^(P*) for some 
jeS. 
Under SNI there is no group of agents who can coordinate paths and weakly 
improve all of them, and at least one agent in the group strictly improve. In 
particular, this is similar to the Strong Nash equilibrium and to the literature on 
group strategyproofness ([12, 15]). 
On the other hand, SNI is stronger than weakly group strategyproof, where 
profitable deviations are such that all agents strictly gain. We provide an example 
below that shows that this property is not enough to derive the main theorem. 
The AC mechanism is also SNI. Indeed, at any deviation Ps of the group of 
agent S from the efficient graph P*, it should be that c ^ ^ < s'k for all 
i G S. Hence no agent in S would strictly improve by deviating. 
Definition 2.7. • The mechanism is demand monotonic (DM) if for 
all feasible problems (c\y), (c;y) G Sk such that y_i = y_i and yi < & : 
Uc\v)<Uc\y). 
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• The mechanism is strongly demand monotonic (SDM) if for all feasible 
problems ( c ;y) , (c;y) G Sk such that y_i = and yi < & : £ _ j ( c ; ? / ) > 
f-i(c; y). 
Demand monotonicity is a weak property that requires that whenever the de-
mand of the agent increases, everything else fixed, his payment should not decrease. 
Notice that does not preclude the payment of other agents would not change. Un-
der SDM, the increase on the demand of one agent does not increase the payment 
of other agents. In particular, notice that SDM implies DM since all the agent's 
payments have to add up to a constant. 
AC is clearly strongly demand monotonic since AC(c\ y) — AC(c; y). Thus the 
increase of the demand of one agent does not change the payments of the other 
agents. 
2.3. Main result 
We now turn to the main result of the paper. We characterize the mechanisms 
that meet the efficiency properties discussed above. 
Theorem 2.1. Assume there are three or more agents, then the following state-
ments are equivalent for the mechanism £ : 
(1) £ is EFF and SM. 
(2) £ PNI the efficient graph. 
(3) £ SNI the efficient graph. 
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(4) There is a monotonic function f : R+ —> R+ such that Ylifi(c) = c and 
for all feasible problems (c\y), £(c-,y) = /(c). 
The mechanisms characterized by theorem 2.1 are demand independent, that is 
the cost-share of every agent do not depend on whether the agents are demanding 
cheap or expensive links, instead they only depend on the total cost of the network 
formed. The average cost mechanism, generated by /(c) = ( | , . . . , | ) , is the only 
mechanism in this class that treat equal agents equally. 
The above statements are independent. Indeed, consider the mechanism 
c 2c c c c 
£(c; y) = (min{j/3, - } , - - min{y3, t;}, t , • • •, t ) -I\I t\i f\> ft/ f\j 
First notice that \ implements the efficient graph because at the efficient graph 
agents {3,... ,k} do not have the incentive to deviate since by doing so their 
payment is going to increase. On the other hand, agents {1,2} do not have any 
incentive to deviate from the efficient equilibrium since the functions min{y3, | } 
and y — min{j/3, | } are weakly monotonic in the total cost of the network and do 
not depend on their report. 
/ is also an example of a mechanism that is not SNI, but agents cannot strictly 
improve by coordinating. Hence the mechanisms characterized by Theorem 2.1 are 
not weakly group strategyproof. 
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2.3.1. Efficient mechanisms for two agents 
The example above shows that for three or more agents, EFF is not enough to 
characterize the demand independent rules. On the other hand, this property is 
enough when there are two agents. The property is an immediate consequence of 
a separability lemma described below. 
Proposition 2.1. Assume there are two agents, K = {1,2}. A mechanism 
is efficient if and only if there is a monotonic function f : —> R+ such that 
/i(c) + /2(c) = c and for all feasible problems (c; y), £(c; y) = /(c). 
2.3.2. Equal treatment of equals 
Definition 2.8. The mechanism satisfies equal treatment of equals (ETE) if 
for all agents i,j and (c; y) € Afk such that yi = yj : ^(c; y) = f-(c; y). 
ETE is the standard property of equal responsibility for the cost of the good. 
Equal agents with the same demand should be allocated the same cost. There is a 
large class of solutions that meet ETE. We describe in section 2.4 alternative rules 
that meet ETE, like the Proportional and Egalitarian solution. 
Theorem 2.2. A mechanism is EFF and ETE if and only if it is AC. 
Notice this proposition is not directly implied by theorem 2.1, since we do not 
need Strong Monotonicity. Instead, it is a separability lemma discussed in section 
5. 
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2.4. Individually rational mechanisms 
Definition 2.9. The mechanism is individually rational if for all (c; y) £ Sk : 
£i(c; y) < yi for all i. 
Individually rational mechanisms rule out cross-subsidies, that is no agent 
should pay more that the cost of their demand. 
Notice neither AC nor any mechanism discussed in theorem 2.1 meet individual 
rationality. Therefore, the traditional incompatibility of efficiency, budget balance 
and individual rationality also holds in this problem.4 
On the other hand, there is a large class of individually rational mechanisms 
that are network independent: most of the mechanisms discussed in the rationing/bankruptcy 
literature meet IR, see for instance [20, 18]. 
Definition 2.10. • The proportional mechanism (PR): PRl{c\ y) = 
Vi
 c 2/1H 1-Vk 
• The egalitarian mechanism (EG): EGi(c-,y) = m i n { y l ; A} where A solves 
E i m i n 0 / i . A } = c -
4Nevertheless, this incompatibility only holds since we consider Network Independent mecha-
nisms. If we remove network independence then there is large class of mechanisms that always 
implement the efficient network and at the same time meet individual rationality. For instance, 
consider the proportional to stand-alone mechanism rfT discussed above. r f r is individually ra-
tional because no agent pays more than his stand alone, which in turns is less than his demand. 
On the other hand, r f r implements the efficient allocation because the cost-share of every agent 
is in proportion to the cost of the network, therefore any deviation of the efficient graph that 
increases the total cost of the network formed would increase the cost share of all the agents. 
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PR and EG are the traditional and most compelling mechanisms in the cost-
sharing literature. PR divides the cost in proportion to their demands. On the 
other hand, EG divides the cost equally across the agents subject to no agent 
paying more than their demand. 
Contrary to the traditional analysis of this problem. The games induced by 
PR and EG are not potential games, therefore the previous potential techniques 
used in the analysis of this problems do not work anymore. We do not know if 
any mechanism (induced by a rationing method) always has a pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium. Nevertheless, we show below that PR and EG always have a pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium and provide algorithms to compute them. 
Lemma 2.2. PR and EG always admit a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 
Even if the existence of equilibrium of other individually rational mechanisms 
is unknown, no mechanism would be more efficient than EG. 
Theorem 2.3. i. There is no mechanism that is individually rational 
and EFF. Any individually rational mechanism has a PoS at least H(k) = 
1 + 5 + - - + S-
ii. The PoS of EG is H(k). 
iii. The PoS of PR is of order k. 
Since the Shapley mechanism has a price of stability equal to H(k), then EG 
is as inefficient Shapley. No other individually rational mechanism can be more 
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efficient than EG and Shapley. On the other hand, the traditional proportional 
mechanism is extremely inefficient, since its price of stability is bounded by k, its 
maximal loss approaches that in the limit. 
2.5. Conclusions 
This paper provides a new perspective to the problem of cost-sharing in net-
works. In particular, we provide new concepts of implementation and characterize 
the class of mechanisms that meet three robust definitions of efficiency. The aver-
age cost mechanism is the benchmark mechanism characterized by this paper. 
It is also shown that efficiency and individual rationality are not compatible. 
The egalitarian mechanism is optimal across the mechanisms that are are indi-
vidually rational. EG is not efficient, but is an optimal mechanism across all 
individually rational mechanisms using the price of stability measure. We also 
show that EG outperforms the Shapley mechanism on the grounds of efficiency, 
stability and fairness. 
We do not know if EG is the unique optimum mechanism within the individually 
rational mechanisms, but conjecture this is true. We know that other mechanisms, 
like the proportional mechanism, are much more inefficient than EG. The difficulty 
we encounter in tackling this question is that even for simple rationing mechanisms, 
there is no general technique to evaluate whether or not these mechanisms even 
have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 
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Finally, we conjecture that our main characterization theorem discussed above 
on Pareto-Efficient implementation can be extended to a more general class of 
mechanisms that only depend on the path chosen by the agents and the network 
formed (notice this class contains the Shapley mechanism and all traditional sep-
arable mechanisms). 
2.6.1. The claim in the "Related literature" section 
Before stating the claim we define potential games which will be used in the proof 
of the claim. 
Definition 2.11. A game is said to be a potential game if there exists a 
function P : £>i x 52 x... x Sk —> R such that for every 1 <i<k, for every xix\ E Si, 
and for every x_i £ S_i it holds that Ui(xi,x_i) > Ui{x[,x-i) P{xi,x^i) > 
P(x'i,x_i). If it holds also that Ui(xi,x_i) — u^x'^x^i) = P(xi,x_i) — P{x'i,x_i), 
then the game is said to be an exact potential game. 
The game induced by the Sh is an exact potential game where the potential 
function P is the following 
2.6. Proofs 
(2.1) 
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where,(i) nx(e) is the number of players whose strategy contains edge e € E 
under the strategy profile x and (ii) H(k) = 1 + 1 / 2 + 1 / 3 + ... + 1 /k. 
Claim 2.1. The upper bound on PoS of Shapley mechanism in general undi-
rected graphs is 4/3 when there are two players. 
Proof. Let {si,£i} and {52,^2} be the demand nodes of player 1 and 2 respec-
tively. Notice first, that in any optimal graph or in any graph which is a NE, 
the shared section of paths of the agents is an interval. Otherwise, there will be 
cycles contradicting the optimality of the graph or giving at least one of the play-
ers a strictly profitable deviation under the Shapley rule. Let the cost structure 
of the optimal graph be the following. x3 is the cost of the shared path. xx h 
x2 respectively are the costs of the paths connecting si & s2 to the shared path, 
ix & x2 respectively are the costs of the paths connecting ti & t2 to the shared 
path. Similarly, the costs of the respective paths in the equilibrium graph achieved 
by the best rsponse dynamics (which always converges) starting from the optimal 
graph are yi,y2,y3,yi&y2 • See figure 2.2 below (the dotted graph is the NE from 
br dynamics from the optimal graph and the solid graph is the optimal graph). • 
Since the NE is achieved from the br dynamics, the potential of the NE must 
be no more than that of the optimal. Therefore, we have the following inequality 
2/i + V2 + 3y3/2 + 2/1 + m < xi + x2 + 3x3/2 + £1 + x2 (1) 
Since the dotted graph is a NE, we have the following inequality 
Optimal graph 
\ 
NE from best 
response 
Figure 2.2. Upper bound on PoS of Sh in undirected graphs for 2 
agent case 
2/i < x1+x2 + y2/2 
y2 < x1 + x2+y1/2 
(2) + (3) 
Vi + V2 < 4(xi + X2) 
Similarly, 
Vi+i/2 < 4(2:1+2:2) 
(4) + (5) 
Vl + 2/2 + Vl + V2 < 4(^1 + X2 + X! + x2) 
(6) x 1/3 + (1) x 8/3 
3(2/i + y2 + y\ + y2) + 4y3 < 4(xi + x2 + xi + x2 + x3) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
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=>• 3 (y i + y2 + yi + fa + 2/3) < 4 ( i i + x2 + xx + x2 + x3) 
U 
The bound is tight is demonstrated by the known example in figure 2.3 below 
Here both the agents 1 and 2 want to connect to the same source and they 
end up using the edges (sti) and (st2) as the only NE and thus making the total 
connection cost go to 2. Note that the minimum cost of connection is 3/2+e. Thus 
in the limit the PoS is 4/3. 
2.6.2. Proof of Lemma 2.2 
2.6.2.1. Existence of equilibrium for PR. 
Figure 2.3. Lower bound on PoS of Sh in 2 agent case 
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Proof. We prove a stronger property which is that the best response (br) dynamics 
(one agent at a time) of any arbitrary fixed ordering of agents converges to a NE, no 
matter from where we start the br dynamics. Suppose on contrary, that for some 
fixed ordering of agents the br dynamics from some point "s" does not converge. 
This means that there is a cycle of a finite length I - s(l) —> s(2) —> s(3) —> 
—> s(l) —> s(l) . Say, without loss of generality, this cycle includes deviations 
by the set of agents M = {l ,2, . . . ,m} C K . The strategy of agents in K/M 
is fixed at s~M. Notice that I is at least as big as 2m. This is so because after 
the I best responses we arrive at the original strategy profile i.e., s(l). Since, 
every agent in M is a part of the cycle which in turn means that they change 
their strategy at least once. Therefore, it must be the case that every agent in 
M takes its turn at least twice so that they reach the original profile i.e., s(l). 
Let's assume that agent i € M takes its turn in the br dynamics n* > 1 number of 
times so that nl = I. Let the strategies played by the agent i in the cycle be 
s i ;1, s i ;2,..., sv>n% s t ;1 and so on. Let's call the agent who takes his turn of br in the 
movement from st to s t+i as agent at. Therefore, s(l) = (s1;1, s2;1,..., sm;1, s~M) , 
a(2) = a _ a i ( l ) ) , 5(3) = ( S ^ 2 , 5 _ a 2 ( 2 ) ) , , 8 ( 1 - 1 ) = ( 3 ^ - ^ , 3 ^ ( 1 -
2)), s(l) = (sa , ;n°i,s_a j(/ — 1)). Here, we use the standard notation where s_i(t) 
represents the strategy profile of K\{i} fixed at that in s(t). We abuse the notation 
and say that the cost of sp;i is equal to sp ; \ Here the cost of the network formed 
by the strategy profile s(i) = C(GS^). Now, ^(C(GS^)-, s(i)) = s J ;Mj where Ai 
is fixed for any particular s(i) and sj'p represents the strategy of agent j in s(i) . 
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The fixed Ai for an s(i) is the ratio of C'(GS^)) to the sum of the costs of individual 
paths in s(i). 
Now every step of the cycle corresponds to an inequality which we will present 
as following: 
Step 1: s(l) s(2) = » 
(1) a°i:2 x A2 < sai;1 x Ax 
Step 2: s(2) -» s(3) 
(2) 5a2;2 x A, < sa2;1 x Ao 
Step 3: s(3) «(4) 
(3) sa3;t x A4 < sa3;t~1 xA3;t = 3 if a3 = ai 
2 otherwise 
Step p: s(p) —s(p+ 1) 
65 
(P) sa»;t x < s 0 ^ - 1 x A p - t e {1,2,..., n0p} 
Step 1: si —> si 
(1) X A I < S X A 
If we multiply the systems (2), (3), ..., (1) together5, then everything else cancels 
out and we are left with s°i;2 x A2 > s°i;1 x Ai which contradicts the inequality (1). 
Therefore, we conclude that there can not be any cycle no matter what ordering 
of agents and what initial point we follow for the best response dynamics. • 
2.6.2.2. Existence of equilibrium for EG and POS(EG) = H(k). 
Proof. We prove by induction on the number of players that EG has an equilib-
rium and the POS(EG) = H(k). 
The base of induction is one player. This case is trivially true for one player 
since the game is just an optimization exercise and any optimal graph, which is a 
cheapest path of connecting her demand nodes, is a NE . 
5Notice, we can do that since everything here is positive 
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We now assume that for all networks with number of agents m < n, with an 
efficient efficient graph G*m there exists a NE which costs no more than H(m) * 
G(Gj^). We claim that for a network with n agents, with an efficient graph G* there 
exists a NE of cost no more than H(n)*C(G*). Let's call the set N = {1,2,3,..., n}. 
Let's start from the efficient graph G* . Now, under £ura(G*)6 there can be two 
cases. Either there exist an agent t s.t. ^ni{G*n) < & or ^ni{G*n) = ^ ,Vj e N. 
If it is the the first case then pick the agent with the lowest cost share7 and call 
this agent, "agent If it is the second case then there can be two cases. Either 
there exist an agent who has a profitable deviation or there doesn't exist such an 
agent. If there doesn't exist such an agent then our claim is trivially true since 
G* is a NE. If such agents exist then pick one of them and call her "agent i". 
Now, ask the agent i to take her best response. There can be two cases- either 
a
ni(G*n) = A(y) = or ^ni(G*n) = Vi < In both the cases, the only 
way agent i has a profitable best deviation is when she moves to a cheapest path 
P* (which is also called the stand alone of agent i) connecting her demand nodes 
s.t., 
(6.1) C(P*) < ani(G*n) < ^ ^ 
6£unl(G) is defined in the obvious way, where d(G) = C(G) and yx = C(Pi) where Pi is the path 
chosen by agent i. 
7 C(G*} 
In fact we can pick any agent with the cost share less than Knn>. It doesn't matter for the 
proof. 
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Now, there can be two cases. 
Case 1: There exists such a cheapest path P* and agent i moves to P*. 
In this case, the new network has a cost C s.t., C{G*n) <C< C(G*n) + C(P*). 
Let's consider an efficient graph G*_{ for connecting all the agents in N/{i}. Notice 
that since there are less nodes to be connected and all edges are still available, we 
have the following inequality 
(6.2) C(GU) < C(G*n) 
Now, ignoring agent i there will be a network game with the the player set 
N/{i}. From the induction hypothesis it follows that there exists a graph config-
uration G^f which is a NE of this game and 
(6.3) C(GIlf) < H(n — 1) * C(G*_i). 
We claim that if we add player i to the set N/{i} then the configuration Gn, 
where i is playing P* and N/{z} are fixed at the configuration G^f, is a NE of the 
game amongst the player set N. Let's denote the demand profile in Gn and by 
y and respectively. First notice that the optimality of G* implies that C(Gn) > 
C(G*n). But, this means that agent i who is paying C{P*) < < does 
not have any profitable deviation. This is so because P* is the cheapest path to 
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connect her demand nodes and it is impossible to bring the A (y) below given 
the optimality of G*. Let's think about the players in N/{i} under Gn . By the 
addition of player i in the network, the strategy space of players in N/{i} remain 
unchanged. Only thing which may change is the cost shares of the agents. For 
all j , > £Jni(Gn).This happens so because A (y) < A (y_i). Thus, 
the agents whose cost shares were below A(y) remain unaffected. Also, they will 
not have any profitable deviation since they are already paying their stand alone 
costs and by introduction of new player i their strategy set remains unchanged and 
thus their stand alone remains unchanged. For the agents whose cost shares were 
above A(y), their stand alone must be above A(y). Therefore, the only deviation 
ijj which is profitable to such an agent j is the one which brings the A (y~j ,y j ) 
below A(y). But, such a deviation would have been profitable in the game with 
the player set N/{i} under the configuration G^f contradicting G^f being a NE. 
Thus we have shown that Gn is a NE. Only thing which remains to be shown is 
that C(Gn) < H(n) * C(G*n). Since G„ is the union of the edges of G^f and P* 
we must have 
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(2.2) C(Gn) < C{GnJ) + C(P*) 
(2.3) < H(n - 1) * C(GU) + C(Pn 
(2.4) < H(n-l)*C(G*n) + C(Pn 
(2.5) < H(n - 1) * C(G*n) + ^ p -
(2.6) — H(n) * C{G*n) 
Here the second, third and fourth inequalities comes from (6.3), (6.2) and (6.1) 
respectively. 
Case 2: There doesn't exist a br deviation for agent i. But, from the way we 
have chosen our agent i, this means that iji under G*n is less than . Then we 
call the existing choice of the path by agent i as P* and everything else follows 
exactly as in the case 1 above. • 
2.6.3. Preliminary Lemmas 
Definition 2.12. The mechanism is monotonic in cost if for all feasible prob-
lems (c;y), (c';y) 6 MK such that c < d: £(c;y) < £(c?;y). 
Lemma 2.3. If the mechanism £ is efficient then it is monotonic in total cost. 
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c'-c yi-c'+c 
Figure 2.4. Inefficiency under smaller total cost 
a' 
a d t, 
Figure 2.5. Inefficiency under larger total cost 
Proof. Consider two feasible problems (c; y) and (c; y), where c > c and (c — c) < 
minjy,}. Suppose, there exists an agent i and an efficient £ such that ^(c; y) < 
i€K 
y). Then we can have a network configuration which will contradict the effi-
ciency of Consider a network where, agents j ^ i have just one strategy each 
Pj which costs yj. Agent i has two strategies Pl and P[ both of which cost y. 
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but Pi makes the total cost of the network c and P/ makes the total cost go up 
to c. To see what kind network will generate these problems, consider the follow-
ing two cases. Case 1: c < Ylj&Vj- this case we can have a configuration as 
shown in figure 2.4. Here, the demands of agents in is contained in the 
interval a —> b which costs c. This is possible since when c = Ylj^iVji we can 
have a —» b as the concatenation of the demand links of the agents j / i .When 
c < Yli^iVj w e c a n have the demand links overlapping e.g., when max{y,} = c, 
then a —> b is the demand link of the biggest demander and all other demands 
overlap with his. Pi = Si —> v3 —> U and P? = Si v2 v3 U. 
All the costly links of Pi is contained in { U P,} whereas there are links of cost 
d — c which are not contained in { U P,} under P/. Again, this is possible since d 
and c are close enough to guarantee that for all i we can have such paths. Case 2: 
Ylj^K Vj > c > yj- this case we can have a configuration as shown in figure 
2.5. Here, the interval a —> b is the concatenation of the demand links of agents 
in K\{i} . Thus \a -» b\ = a\ = c - \a ^ d\ = d - c. 
|Si —> a —> d\ = |s; —• a' —> d\ = d - Y^j^iVj- Pi = Si a d U and 
P/ = Sj —> a' —> d —> ti. Notice that it may be the case that ti = b. Now clearly 
in both the cases, i will have a profitable deviation from the efficient graph of cost 
c thus contradicting the efficiency of Thus we have shown that efficient £ must 
be monotonic in total cost in some open neighborhood of c for all c. Therefore, we 
can extend the argument to conclude that £ must be monotonic in total cost in 
general. • 
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0 
Figure 2.6. Efficiency amounts to separability 
Lemma 2.4 (Separability Lemma). If the mechanism £ is efficient then =>• 
£ ( C ; y ) = ( £ 1 ( C ; y _ i ) , £ 2 ( C ; y _ 2 ) , , £ f c ( C ; y_ f e ) ) - That is, any efficient mecha-
nism is separable and assigns the costs shares to the agents independently of their 
demand. 
Proof. If we prove that for any feasible problems (c; y) and (c; yi; y_j), any contin-
uous and efficient £ must have £j(c;y) = ^(c; y,, then we are done. Consider 
a feasible problem (c; y).Consider a graph as shown in Figure 2.6 which generates 
this problem. The sources and sinks of agents j ^ i lie on the the ray a b 
according the demand profile, i.e., the agent with the highest demand covers most 
of the span on a —> b and so on. Thus, an agent j ^ i has one strategy which 
generates the demand y,. Agent i has two strategies- either connect s, — U through 
vi or through v2. The demands of agent i when connecting through vx and v2 are 
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iji and y% respectively. Now, the total cost when i uses vx and v2 are respectively 
"c + e" and "c". Notice, by moving the position of v2 and arranging the demand 
links of the agents j ^ i, we can generate all the feasible problems (c; y ,^ y_i). Also, 
by moving the position of v\ and arranging the demand links of the agents j ^ i, 
we can generate all the feasible problems (c + e; y—») - Consider an efficient £ 
which is continuous. Efficiency of £ requires the following inequality 
(2.7) < £i(c + e ;y i ,y_ i ) 
Using continuity we get 
(2.8) £j(c;ViiV-i) < ii{c\yi,y-i) 
Similarly, switching the position of and v2 and using continuity again we get 
(2.9) yi,y-i) > y^y-i) 
Thus, we conclude that £t(c; y i ; y_t) = £,(c; yt, y_j) for all feasible problems 
V i i V - i ) and (c;yj,y_i). • 
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2.6.4. Proof of Proposition 2.1 
Consider a problem (c; 2/1,2/2) 6 512. 
By separability lemma: fx(c; 2/1,2/2) = £i(c; c,y2). 
By budget balance: £2(c; 2/1,2/2) = £2(c; c> 2/2)- Thus, "^(c; 2/1,2/2) = t(c\c,y2). 
By separability lemma: £2(c; c, 2/2) = £2(c;c>c)-
By budget balance: £i(c;c,y2) = £i(c;c,c). Thus, £(c;c,y2) = £(c;c,c). 
Hence £(c;yi,y2) = £(c;c,c). 
2.6.5. Proof of Theorem 2.1 
2.6.5.1. 1. =4> 4.. 
Proof. Consider a continuous £ which is efficient and strongly monotonic. Con-
sider two arbitrary feasible problems (c; y) and (c; y). We will prove that £(c; y) = 
£(c; y) = /(c). The monotonicity of / comes from lemma 1. Let a = \ Xweif Vi an<^ 
a = £ YlieK & • Assume without loss of generality that 2/1 <2/2 < 2/3 < < yk 
and 2/1 < y2 < 2/3 < < m-
Step 1: £(c;y) = £(c; a, a,..., a) and £(c;y) = £(c; a, a,...., a) 
Proof: 
Consider the following problems: P0 = (c;y), Px = (c-,a,y2,y3, ...yk), P2 = 
(c; a, a, y3, y4,..., yfc), ,Pfc = (c;a,a, , a). Notice first that feasibility of Pq 
implies the feasibility of Pi, P2,..., Pk • This is true because maximum of the demand 
profile doesn't go above yk in all these problems and sum of the individual demands 
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is always at least k*a = Yhi^K Vi- Similarly, if we define the counterpart problems 
Po,Pi,P2,-,Pk where Pi = (c; a, a,..., a, yi+1, yi+2,..., yk-i, Vk), then again all of 
them will be feasible. 
Now, due to the separability lemma (lemma 2) we must have £i(Po) = £x(Pi). 
But then, strong monotonicity and budget balancedness implies £_1(Po) = £_1(Pi). 
Thus, we have £(Po) = £(Pi)- Using the same argument we have ({Pi) = £(P*+1) 
and ((Pi) = £(P i+i) for all 0 < i < k - 1. Thus, we have £(P0) = £(Pfc) and 
£(P0) = ((PK) as desired. 
Step 2: £(c; a, a,..., a) = £(c; a, a,...., a) 
Proof: 
Notice first that feasibility of (c;a,a, . . . ,a) & f(c; a, a,...., a) implies that any 
problem (c; a) where some of the di = a and other a, = a is also feasible. Now, 
lemma 2 implies £x(c; a, a,..., a) = £x(c; a, a,...., a). Now, there can be three cases-
a < a, a > a or a = a. In the first two cases strong monotonicity and budget bal-
ancedness implies (c; a, a,..., a) = £_x(c; a, a,...., a) and we get £(c-,a,a, ...,a) = 
£(c;a,a, ,...,a). The third case trivially implies £(c; a, a,..., a) = £(c; a, a,...., a) 
since its the same problem so the solution must be the same. Similarly, we get 
£(c;a,a,....,a) = £(c; a, a,..., a) = £(c;a,a,a,...,a) = = £(c; a, a,..., a). 
m 
2. 1. 
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Proof. We know that £ PNI efficient graph implies £ is efficient. We will prove 
that £ PNI efficient graph implies £ is strongly monotonic. Consider a £ which PNI 
efficient graph and a feasible problem (c; y) and assume without loss of generality 
that y\ < y2 < < yk8- Now, consider a graph as shown in figure 2.7 below. 
ak a3 a2 
Figure 2.7. PNI implies strong monotonicity 
Here every agent has two strategies- either use the path in the solid graph or 
use that in the dotted graph. Let's call the solid graph as "**" and the dotted 
graph as "*". Let "*" be a small perturbation of "**" as following. The cost of 
path of an agent j / i in both the graphs is yj. The cost of path of agent i in 
ii**n
 a n c i "* n a r e y. a n ( j y. where yt is in a neighborhood of yt and y% > yl and 
\y% — Ui\ < m i n \ Vj — Vk\- This restriction guarantees the ranking to be preserved 
j,keK 
in the perturbed problem. Let the total cost of "**" and "*" be "c — e" and "c" 
8The case of weak inequality will follow from the assumption of continuity on our method 
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respectively. First we will show that this graph generates all feasible problems 
(c; y). This happens if and only if the following system has a solution: 
xi + ax = yi 
x2 + a2 + ax = 
x3 + a3 + a2 + ax = y3 
xk + ak + afc_x + ••• + ax = yfc 
A: it 
+ a i = c 
i=i i=1 
Vz € i f ; Xi, aj > 0 
We use Farka's Lemma to prove that this system has a solution: 
From the Farka's lemma we know that Ax = 6; x > 0 has a solution if and only 
if > 0; bTz < 0 doesn't have a solution. 
Here, the (k +1) x (2k) matrix A, vector x and vector b are defined as follows: 
1 0 0 .... 1 0 0 .... 
0 1 0 .... 1 1 0 .... 
A= ' 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
X = 
b = 
Xi x2 .... xk a i a2 .... ak 
T 
I 
yi y2 •••• Vk c 
Atz > 0; bTz < 0 gives the following (2k + 1) inequalities; 
(1) z1 + z2 + .... + zk+1 > 0 
(2) z2 + z3 + ... + zk+1>0 
(0 
(k) zk + zk+1 > 0 
+ f^c+i > 0 
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(k+2) z2 + zk+! > 0 
(0 
(2k) zk + zk+1 > 0 
(2k+l) yxzi + y2z2 + + VkZk + czk+1 < 0 
Now, do the following operation on the first k inequalities: y\ x (1) + (y2 — 
Vi) x (2) + + (yk ~ Vk-i) x (fc), to get, 
(2k+2) yxzx + y2z2 + + ykzk + ykzk+i > 0 
Now, for the inequalities (2k+l) and (2k+2) to be compatible, it must be the 
case that Zk+1 < 0. Let, this be the case and let (2k+2) and (2k+l) hold. Then, 
(2k+l) implies: 
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(2k+3) y\Z\ + V2*2 + + VkZk + < 0 
This is true because feasibility requires YlieK V* — c- Now, if we do the following 
operation on inequalities (k + 1) through (2k): y\ x (k + 1) + y2 x (k + 2) + .... + 
yn x (2k), then we get, 
which contradicts (2k+3) to give us the desired result. 
We now prove the strong monotonicity of Clearly, the efficiency of £ implies 
that "**" is a NE but since "*" is a perturbation of "**", we will have "*" as a NE 
for the perturbation small enough. The fact that £ PNI the efficient graph implies 
the following inequality 
(2k+4) 
£(c- e\yuy-i) < £(c\yi,y_<) 
Using continuity we get, 
£(c; ViiV-i) < £(c-,yi,y-i) 
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Now consider a perturbation where every thing is exactly the same but "**" 
costs "c -I- e". Using the same argument of Pareto Nash implementability and 
continuity we get 
Thus we conclude that £(c; , y_i) = £(c; yi,y~i) for yl in an open neighborhood 
of yi. But we can, repeatedly using the open neighborhood argument, show that 
this is true for any arbitrary j/j and yi as long as (c; yi,y~i) and (c; y;, y-i) are both 
feasible. • 
3. 4. 
Consider a continuous £ which implements the efficient graph in Strong NE. 
Consider two arbitrary feasible problems (c;y) and (c; y). We will prove that 
£(c;y) = £(c; y) = /(c). The monotonicity of / comes from lemma 1. Let a = 
I Vi a n d o. = £ J2ieK Assume without loss of generality that yx < y2 < 
y3 < < Vk and yi<y2 <y3< < yk-
Step 1: £(c;y) = £(c;a,a, ...,a) and £(c;y) = £(c;a,a, ,...,a) 
Proof: 
Consider the following problems: P0 = (c;y), PI = (c-,a,y2,y3, ...yk), P2 = 
(c; a, a, y3, ..., yk), ,Pk — ,a)- 'Notice first that feasibility of Pq 
implies the feasibility of Pi, P2,..., PK. This is true because maximum of the demand 
profile doesn't go above yk in all these problems and sum of the individual demands 
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is always at least k * a = Hi• Similarly, if we define the counterpart problems 
Po ,P i ,h , -~ ,Pk where Pi = (c; d, a,..., a, yi+1, yi+2,..., yk-i, Vk), then again all of 
them will be feasible. 
Now, due to the separability lemma (lemma 2) we must have (i(Po) = £i(Pi). 
Also, strong Nash implementability implies that £_i(Po) = £_i(Pi). To see this, 
suppose that it is not the case and for some agent j ^ 1, we have (j(Po) / (j(Pi)-
Assume without loss of generality that (j(Po) < (j(Pi)- This means 3j G j } 
s.t., £j(Po) > (j(Pi), because of budget balancedness. Consider a network where 
all the agents 2,3 , . . . ,k have just one strategy which costs y2,2/3,..., yk and agent 1 
has two strategies, where one of them costs y\ and the other costs a. In both the 
cases, the total cost of the network is c. Thus one of the configurations generates 
the problem Pq and the other Pi. Now both the configurations of the network is 
efficient and therefore at least one of them must be a strong NE under But 
clearly none of them is a strong NE. Erom Pi the group {1 , j } has a profitable 
deviation and from P0 the group {1, j}- Thus, we have £(Po) = ((Pi)- Using the 
same argument we have ((Pi) = £(Pj+i) and ((Pi) = ((Pl+i) for all 0 < i < k — 1. 
Thus, we have ((P0) = ((Pk) and ((P0) = ((Pk) as desired. 
Step 2: £(c; a, a,..., a) = £(c; a, a,...., a) 
Proof: 
Notice first that feasibility of (c-,a,a, ...,a) & ((c; a, a,...., d) implies that any 
problem (c; a) where some of the d; = a and other di = a is also feasible. Now, 
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lemma 2 implies £x(c; a, a,..., a) = £x(c; a, a,...., a). And again, the strong Nash 
implementability implies £_i(c; a, a,..., a) = £_1(c; a, a,...., a). The proof of this 
statement is analogous to the one in step 1. Thus we have £(c; a, a,..., a) = 
£(c;a,a, ,...,a). Similarly, we get £(c; a, a,...., a) = £(c; a, a, ...,a) = £(c;a,a,a, ...,a) = 
= £(c;a,a, ...,a). • 
The results "4. = • 1.," "4. 2" and "4. 3" are straightforward and 
the proof is omitted. 
2.6.6. Proof of Theorem 2.2 
Proof. The "if" part is clear. For, "only if" consider an arbitrary feasible problem 
(c;y). Assume without loss of generality that yi > > > .... > yk- Let,a 
=
 i E t i th- Consider a problem (c;a,a,....,a) and suppose that £ is continuous, 
efficient and satisfies ETE. Notice, the feasibility of (c; y) implies the feasibility of 
(c; a, a,...., a) and any other problem (c; y) where yi = j/j for all i G {1, 2,..., 1} and 
j)i = a for all i G {I, I + 1,..., k — 1, k}. Now, the ETE property of £ implies 
(2.10) £(c;a,a, ,...,a) = (c/k,c/k, ,...,c/k) 
Using lemma 2 and applying ETE again we get, 
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(2.11) £(c;yi,a,....,a) = (c/k,c/k,....,c/k) 
Now again applying lemma 2, and ETE we have, 
(2 .12) £(c-,y1,y2,a,a,....,a) = (xuc/k,x,x,....,x) 
But if we change the ordering of 1 & 2 while arriving the above profile then we 
should have, 
(2.13) ^(c\y1,y2,a,a,....,a) = (c/k,x2,x,x, ....,x) 
But since the ordering is immaterial so we must have x\, x2, x = c/k. And thus 
we have, 
(2.14) £(c-,y1,y2,a,a,....,a) = (c/k,c/k,....,c/k) 
Repeating the same argument, we conclude that £(c; y) = (c/k, c/k, ...,c/k) • 
2.6.7. Proof of Theorem 2.3 
2.6.7.1. Incompatibility of Efficiency and IR. 
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Figure 2.8. Worst case example 
Proof. We show by an example that any individually rational cost sharing rule 
must have a PoS of at least H(k). Consider a situation as shown in figure 2.8. Here, 
every agent i has two strategies- either connect its demand nodes directly where 
the cost of the path is 1 Ji or connect through the the path where link costs are 0 
and 1 + e. Consider any arbitrary cost sharing method £ which satisfies individual 
rationality. We will show that the only equilibrium under such method will be 
where every agent is using their direct path to t. Suppose, this is not the case. 
This means there can be two cases. First case is where all the agents use a free 
link to v and then the common link of cost 1 + e to t. But then at least one of 
the agents must be paying more than 1/k. Lets assume that this agent is the fcth 
agent in some configuration9 of the graph. Then he will have a profitable deviation 
9It is important to note that just one such configuration is enough since PoS is measure of 
performance of the best NE in the worst case example. 
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to go to the direct link of cost 1/k under any individually rational rule. The other 
case to consider is when s agents are using their direct link and k — s agents are 
sharing the common link to ' V . Then it follows from individual rationality of 
the s agents that at least one of the agents in k — s must be paying more than 
l/(k — s). Notice, that in this case there exists an unused direct link, say Sj —> t, of 
cost 1/sj which is at most 1 /(k — s). Now in some configuration of the graph agent 
j will be the agent who is paying the above said amount of more than 1 /(k — s) 
and thus he would like to deviate. We have just shown that the only NE in some 
configuration of this example has a cost equal to H(k) whereas the efficient graph 
has a cost equal to 1 + e where everyone uses a costless link to node v and then 
the common link to t. • 
2.6.7.2. Lower bound for PoS (PR). 
Proof. Consider a situation as shown in figure 2.8. We show that the unique 
equilibrium of the proportional method is of order k. Let, the costs of links Sj —> t 
be Xi and the other things be exactly the same as in figure 2.8. Straightforward 
computations show that the k — th agent will deviate from the efficient graph of 
cost 1 + e if Xk < 1 fc+V(fc i) +4fc(fc _ As k grows, xk converges to the golden 
number in contrast to 1/k for the uniform method which goes to zero. Also 
xt-i > xt for all t = 2,3,..,k and xx = 1. Thus the lower bound on the PoS of 
proportional method is x^  which is of order k. • 
References 
[1] Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Meital Levy, Svetlana Olonetsky, Ronen Shabo, 
2006. On the price of stability for designing undirected networks with fair cost 
allocations, in: ICALP06. 
[2] Anshelevich E., Dasgupta A., Kleinberg L., Tardos E., Wexler T. and Rough-
garden T., 2004. The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allo-
cation. In 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science 
(FOCS), pages 59-73, 2004. 
[3] Chen, H. L., Roughgarden, T., Valiant, G., 2008. Designing Networks with good 
Equilibria, Proceedings of the 19th annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete 
Algorithms. 
[4] Epstein, A., Feldman, M. and Mansour, Y., 2007. Strong Equilibrium in cost 
sharing connection games, ACM conference on Electronic Commerce, San Diego. 
[5] http://www.foxnews.eom/story/0,2933,475507,00.html 
[6] http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28472161/ 
[7] http://archives.chicagotribune.com/2009/jan/05/nation/chi-oregon-gasjan05 
[8] http://watchingthewatchers.org/indepth/24150/gas-vs-mileage-tax 
[9] http://www.kansascity.com/105/story/1299981.html 
[10] http://www.miamiherald.com/news/florida/AP/story/1281003.html 
[11] Jian Li., 2009. An upper bound on the price of stability for undirected Shapley 
network design games. Information Processing Letters 2009. 
87 
88 
[12] Juarez, R. 2008. Group strategyproof cost sharing: the role of indifferences. 
Under Review. 
[13] Juarez, R. 2008. The worst absolute surplus loss in the problem of commons: 
Random Priority vs. Average Cost. Economic Theory 34. 
[14] Marden, J. R., Wierman, A., 2008. Distributed Welfare Games, Forthcoming 
in Operations Research. 
[15] Moulin, H. Incremental Cost Sharing: characterization by coalitional strategy-
proofness, Soc. Choice Welfare 16 (1999), 279-320. 
[16] Moulin, H., 2009. Pricing traffic in spanning network. Proceedings of the ACM 
conference on Electronic Commerce, Stanford. 
[17] Moulin, H. and Shenker, S. 2001. Strategyproof Sharing of Submodular Costs: 
Budget Balance versus Effciency, Economic Theory, 18, 3, 511-533. 
[18] Moulin, H. 2002. Handbook of social choice and welfare. 
[19] Sharkey, W. W., Network models in economics, in: Ball, M. O., Magnanti, T. 
L., Nonma, C. L., Nemhauser, G. L. (Eds.), Handbooks in Operation Research 
and Management Science, Elsevier, New York, 1995, pp. 713-765. 
[20] Thomson, W. 2003. Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and 
taxation problems: a survey. Mathematical Social Sciences 45 249-297. 
CHAPTER 3 
Capacity Constraint, Price Discrimination and Oligopoly 
3.1. Introduction 
The strategic interactions of the firms in industries have been analysed in many 
settings. The literature essentially has many strands originating from Cournot, 
Bertrand and Stackelberg. On the one hand, the outcome of the Cournot is more 
realistic, but on the other hand, the setup of price competition in Bertrand is more 
close to reality. The extemes of Cournot and Bertrand has been put together in 
the seminal paper by Kreps & Scheinkman [5] where capacity competition followed 
by price competition justifies the Cournot outcome. In many industries the ex-
istance of leaders and followers is a natural phenomenon. This is the source of 
another strand originiating from Stackelberg [7]. Yet another dimension of firms' 
behavior when they have market power is that of price discrimination. Therefore, 
the coesistence of price discrimination with the price and quantity competition is 
a natural setup to analyse. This happens invariably in all industries with airline 
industry being a good example. To fix ideas, we will stick to the airline indus-
try example for illustration. There is a class of recent literature focussing on this 
aspect[8, 4, 3, 6] (see [8] for a survey). Hazledine[3], considers the Cournot setup 
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with price discrimination. He finds out that the contrast from the single-price 
standard Cournot model is in the quantity produced in the market. He also finds 
out that the average price in the market is independent of the degree of price dis-
crimination and thus the standard models' prediction is not misleading in terms of 
the average price. Kutlu [6] incorporates price discrimination in the Stackelberg 
model and finds a counterintutive result that leader does not price-discriminate. 
Our paper differs from the earlier works in that we analyse this situation as a 
two stage game. In the first stage, the firms compete on quantities that they will 
put in the market and in the second stage they will decide what fraction of the 
quantity they will sell to different group of buyers. In other words, in the second 
stage of competition for price discrimination there is a capacity constraint. For 
example, in the airline industry the valuation of the buyers is a function of the 
time when they are buying the tickets. The business travellers whose plans are 
generally last moment have less elastic demand whereas the tourists whose plans 
are almost always flexible have relatively more elastic demand. Thus different bins 
(groups) of buyers can be grouped based on the day they want to buy a particular 
airline seat. For example, higher bins consists of the likes of business travellers. In 
the first stage, when the firms enter the market, they buy certain number of planes 
thus the total number of seats are decided for the second stage of the game. They 
can not buy planes everyday but they can decide how to allocate the total number 
of tickets during a time frame. This critical assumption of the stages is missing in 
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the literature that we just reviewed and we hope that this will explain the missing 
results. 
Our paper also differs from most other works e.g., [3, 6] in that we find results 
for general demand function rather than linear demand. We consider two firms 
for simplicity. The main finding of our paper is that in the second stage both 
the firms -will be active in the higher bins. If there are k bins then the firm with 
higher capacity will be active in all the k bins. Also, the smaller firm will be 
active in top t bins( proposition 3.1). Moreover, in the bins 1,2,...,£ — 1 it will 
match the quantity sold by the bigger firm (proposition 3.2). In proposition 3.2 we 
characterize the behavior of the firms upto finding %. Although the exact value of 
i is not given in proposition 3.2, for linear demand case we solve for the unique i 
using the corollaries 3.1 and 3.2. Finally, we show firms behavior in the benchmark 
Cournot case. 
3.2. The Model and Results 
Assume for simplicity that there are only two firms, A and B, in the market. 
Let the constant marginal cost of these firms which is normalized to zero. We 
assume that each consumer buys at most one unit of the good. The firms know 
valuations of the consumers and can prevent resale of the good. They divide the 
consumers into bins according to their reservation prices. The price of the good 
for the kth bin is given by: 
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(3.1) Pk = P{Qk) 
where q\ and qlB are the quantities sold in bin i by A and f?; Qk = Yli=i(QA + 1B) 
is the total quantity sold in all bins from 1 to k] and P is a twice continously 
differentiate, strictly decreasing, and strictly concave inverse demand function 
that represents consumers' valuations. 
Assume that the total capacities of the firms are exogenously given by QA 
and QB• Given these capacities firms are competing on the shares that they 
they assing to each bin. Hence, firms choose SA — (s^, s2A,..., sA) and SB = 
( 4 , 4 , . . . , s | _ 1 , s f ) with J2?=IsA = 1 a n d J2?=I sB = 1 w h e r e 1A = QAS\ and 
QB = QBS^B-
Going back to our example of airline seats offered for a specific route, from now 
on we can think of the product 'an airline seat' and a seller 'an airline' 
We provide the solution for the optimization problem of A and the B's solution 
is the same. The optimization problem of the firms are given by: 
K 
(3.2) maxnA = QAY^P^A 
i=1 
K 
st > 0 and J2s lA = l 
i=1 
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The Lagrangian for (3.2) is given by: 
(3.3) = ^ + 
3 = 1 
Let flA = For any i = 1,2, ...,K the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are given 
by:2 
(3.4) 
(3.5) 
(3.6) 
(3.7) 
< p i + | f r - 0 
K 
E 4 = i 
*;=i 
> o 
Proposition 3.1. Assume that for some bin i e {1,2,..., K} we have slA — 0, 
then s ^ 1 = 0. 
^ o t e that we are solving the problem of an active firm. Therefore it is assumed that QA > 0. 
2For notational simplicity we represent by 
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Proof. Assume to get a contradiction that slA = 0 and s^ 1"1 > 0 for some i G 
{1,2, ...,K — 1}. Then we have: 
_ * dPk+1 dQk
 k 
hdQdskASA 
Here the inequality comes from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions; the first equality 
follows from our assumption that slA = 0; and the second equality follows from 
the Kuhn-Tucker conditions given that s^1 > 0. Hence, Pi < Pi+l. But by the 
monotonicity of the demand P1 > Pl+l implying that P% = Pl+1. This in turn 
implies that there are K — 1 bins which is a contradiction. • 
The following proposition shows the behavior of the firms in all the bins for a 
general demand function. Eventhough we don't have a closed form solution, for a 
specific demand function this proposition gives a recursive way to get the explicit 
solution. In one of the corollaries later we give an explicit solution for the linear 
demand case. 
Proposition 3.2. Assume thatQA < QB. Let I G {1,2,..., K, K + 1} be such 
that sA = s^1... = sA = = 0 and sA > 0 for all j < i.3 The optimal shares 
for A and B are described as follows: 
3Even though there are K bins, we are using the index up to K + 1 in order to include the case 
where QA = Q b or they are so close that A is active in all the bins. Hence, i = K + 1 means 
that szA > 0 in all bins i = 1,2, . . . , K. 
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Case I ( j < i - 2): 
3 3+1 r)Pi 
(3.8) P ( 2 Q A J 2 s k A ) - P ( 2 Q A ^ s k A ) = - — r g A a j 
k=i fc=i ^ 
A 
3+1 
(3.9) P ( 2 Q B ] T s * ) - P{2QBY,sb) = dQ 
k=i fc=i ^ 
Case 7/ ( j = i-2): 
?
-
2
 *-
2
 BP1 - 2 (3.10) + + = - - q q - Q a s ^ 2 
k=1 fc=l ^ 
a n 1 - 2 
(3.11) P ( 2 Q B E S ^ ) - P ( g A + Q B E s ^ ) = - — — Q ^ - 2 dQ 
k=i fc=i ^ 
Case 7/7 ft > i - 2): 
(3.12) sjA = 0 for j >i-l 
i - 2 
(3.13) s ^ 1 = 1 - ] T , 
fc=i 
j+i np j 
(3.U)P(Qa + QbJ24)~P(QA + QBY,sb) = —^QB^B for j < K dQ 
(3.15) s f = 
iC-l 
)t=i 
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Proof. We will first prove the following lemmas which will be the key to the proof 
of the proposition. • 
Lemma 3.1. Assume that QA < QB- Let i <E {2, ...,K,K + 1} be such that 
SA = sa'- = SA+1 — 0 and Sa > 0 for ali 3 < i- Then for aU 3 e {!» 2> •••> K} we 
have sB > 0. 
Proof. In order to prove the lemma, we consider two cases. 
Case 1 (i < K): If i < K, then sB > 0. Otherwise, there will not be K bins 
which is a contradiction. 
Case 2 (i = K + 1): We prove by induction. From Proposition 3.1 it follows 
that sB > 0. Let's assume that sB > 0 for all j < t. We will show that s^ > 0. 
Assume not, i.e. slB = s^"1 = ... = sB = 0. From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions we 
know that for j < t: 
K Qpk 
(3.16) P* + Q A Y . - * n ° A + tA = 0 
k=j Cv 
K gpk 
(3.17) p j
 + Q B < £ s^ + fa = o 
k=j °V 
Let Aj - Qa ETJ and B3 = QB Therefore: 
(3.18) P> + AJ + IIA = 0 
(3.19) PJ+BJ+FIB = 0 
(3.20) pt + At + fiA = 0 
(3.21) Pt + Bt + jjLg < 0 
Subtracting the equality (3.20) from the inequality (3.21) gives 
(3.22) Bt - At + /iB - \iA < 0 
Prom (3.18) and (3.19), we know that: 
(3.23) = Aj - Bj 
Therefore, we have: 
(3.24) BT-AT + AJ -BJ < 0 
(3.25) Bj - Aj + Aj-1 - Bj_! = 0 
From equations (3.24) and (3.25), we have: 
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Q p * - l Qpt-1 
(3.26) + < o 
apt-2 apt-2 
+ = 0 
dP 1 d P 1 (3.27) _ o 
Prom monotonicity of demand, we have < 0. Therefore: 
(3.28) Qbs^ 1 < QAS^1 
Summing over bins 1,2, ...,t — 1 we get: 
(3.29) Q b Y , s B < Q A Y , s 
t - i t-I 
k 
A 
k=1 fc=l 
or 
t - i 
(3.30) Q b < Q a Y ^ s a < Q A 
k=1 
The strict inequality follows from the fact that A is active in all bins untill bin 
K. This is a contradiction. • 
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Lemma 3.2. Assume that QA < QB- Let % £ {3, ...,K,K + 1} be such that 
sA = = sa+1 = 0 and sA > 0 for 3 < Then for j < i — 1 we have: 
(3.31) (?A = <FB 
Proof. Note that by Lemma 3.1 we have sB > 0 for j e {1,2,..., K}. Hence, for 
all j < L we have Pj = - %QAS\ - jlA = - %QB^b ~ As- Hence, 
Pj ~ Pj+1 =<?A = <?B-
Now, we continue to prove the proposition. Note that for j < % — 1 we have : 
(3.3V)(QJ) - P(Qj+1) 
(3.33) 
(3.34) 
Also, by Lemma 3.1 using the similar steps as above we get: 
ft pi 
(3.35) P(Qj) - P(Qj+1) = —qqQbsjb 
For case I, we have j < i— 2. Therefore Qj = QA E L I skA+QB E L I 4 - Since, 
j < i — 2 by Lemma 3.2 we have QA^a = QBS^b- Hence, Qj — 2QAY11=i 4 = 
2QB E L i 4 and Qj+1 = 2QA J2{T\ 4 = 2QB E £ i 4 -
- (-QAZ 
M^dP K dPk 
'A ~ P-A) ~ {~QA E - P-A) k=j dQ 
£ dPk 
k=j+i 9Q 
dPj 
~dQ 
K
 BPk 
= QA{ E - E ^ r 4 ) k=j dQ 
QASJA 
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For case II, we have j = 1-2. Therefore QJ = 2 QA Y?K~=I SA = 2QB J2'K~I SB 
a n d Q3+1 = QA( 1 + £ 1 = 1 4 ) + QBS'-1 = QA+QB £ L = 1 4 -
For case III, notice that QA is exhausted after bin i — 1. For bin i — 1, s^"1 
is the residual share for A. By Lemma 3.1, B is active in bins i, i + 1 ,...,K, 
i.e. slB, s'g1,..., > 0. Therefore from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for all j = 
i, i + 1,..., K — 1 we have: 
K Qpk 
(3-36) P ' + Q b E ^ b + ^B = 0 
k=j ai<J 
K flpk 
(3.37) Pj+1 + QB £ -Sn^B + HB = 0 k=j+1 cy 
Hence, we have: 
(3.38) pi _ pi+1 = 0P
j 
' dQ QBS
3B 
or 
j j+1 gpj 
(3.39) P{QB J2SB + QA) ~ P(QB E 4 + QA) = —QQQB^ 
k=1 fc=l ^ 
Now, we describe the solution algorithm. From the cases above, we can recur-
sively solve sJB in terms of for j < K. Moreover, since we have J2k=i sB = 1> 
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we can solve for Once we have the solution for s^'s we can solve for s^'s as 
follows. From Case I, we can recursively solve sJA in terms of for j < % — 1. 
Since we have s ^ 1 = 1 — YlV^i sAi w e c a n solve for s^"1 in terms of as well. In 
order to solve for s^, we use Lemma 3.2. That is, given the solution for is 
given by: 
(3.40) ^ = 
Note that depending on the value of % some of the cases disappear. Hence, 
the sequence of shares might start from Case II or Case III rather than Case I. 
Whenever i > 3 the solution algorithm starts from Case I; if i = 3, the the solution 
algorithm starts from Case II; and if % = 2, the the solution algorithm starts from 
Case III. • 
In Proposition 3.2 we described the conditions for equilibrium shares for a gen-
eral demand function. Now, in the following proposition, we give more conditions 
which will help identifying i. 
Proposition 3.3. For any i = 2,3,..., K + 1 we have: 
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J - i (3.41) Q a s ^ 1 < QbSb 
»-2 »-l QP1-2 
HQ (3.42) P ( 2 Q A ^ 4 ) - P ( 2 Q A £ 4 ) > k=1 fc=l 
Proof. First, we prove the inequality (3.41). From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
we know that: 
(3.43) pt + Ai + fa < 0 
(3.44) P*" + B« + AB = 0 
(3.45) P*-1 + Ai-i + }iA = 0 
(3.46) P1'1 + + Ab = 0 
where A, = QA E l , and B3 = QB • %s%. 
Then we have: 
(3.47) Pi - P ' - 1 4- A* - At-1 < 0 
(3.48) P% - P1'1 + Bi - Bi-i = 0 
Hence: 
(3.49) At - Ai-1 < Bi - Bi-1 
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or 
dP^L i - i d p l ~ X 
dQ QaSa ~ dQ (3-50) I ^ Q A S a
1
 < ^FTQbs'B 
By monotonicity of the demand we know that 1 < 0. Therefore we have: 
(3.51) Qas'X1 < QBS'b1 
Now, we prove the inequality (3.42). Prom Proposition 3.2 we know that: 
BP1-2 (3.52) P(2QA E 4 ) - P ( g A ( l + + Q B s ^ ) = — Q Q - Q A S ^ 2 
k=1 fc=l ^ 
or 
?
~
2
 dP~l-2„ J_2 (3.53) P ( 2 g A 5 3 4 ) - P{2QA 5 3 4 + QA4_ 1 + <5b4_1) = — q q - Q a s . 
k=1 fe=l ^ 
Since g^s^"1 < Qss^"1 by monotonicity of the demand we have: 
i-2 t-1 
(3.54) P ( 2 g A 5 3 4 + QAS'X1 + QBS'B1) < P(2QA 5 3 4 ) 
fc=l k=l 
Therefore: 
' -2 »-l flpi-2 (3.55) p ( 2 g A 5 ] 4 ) - P V Q a 5 3 4 ) < — d d ~ Q A S A 2 
k=1 fc=l ^ 
A 
• 
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In what follows we consider the linear demand case for expositional simplicity4. 
Corollary 3.1 (Corollary to Proposition 3.2). Assume that QA < QB- Let i 
£ {2,..., K, K + 1} be such that s\ = s^1 . . . = sA = 0 and sjA > 0 for all j < i. 
Moreover, assume that the demand is linear given by: 
(3.56) Pj = a- Qj 
The optimal shares for A and B are described as follows: 
Case 1 (i = 2): 
(3.57) s i = 1 
(3.58) sJA = 0 i / j > l 
(3.59) 4 = 1 
Case 2 (i> 3): 
Case I ( j < % - 1 ): 
4For a general demand function the equilibrium can be calculated in a similar fashion. 
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(3.60) 
(3.61) 
Case II ( j = i - l ) 
(3.62) 
(3.63) 4" 1 
Case III ( j >1-1): 
(3.64) ^ = 0 
(3.65) 4 = 
Proof. For Case 1, note that by definition of i and Lemma 3.1 we have s\ = 1. 
From equations (3.14) and (3.15) we have: 
sJ — s1 
.4 -
 2J-i A 
sn = 23 F T * * 
= 2 s 1 -
QA 
QB 
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3 3+1 
{ZM)[a-QA-QBj^skB)-{a-QA-QBY^3kB) = QB^Bioxj<K 
k=l k=1 
K-1 
(3-67) 4 = 
fc=i 
Hence: 
(3.68) sJB+1 = 4 for j < if 
k - I 
k=I 
(3.69) 4 = 1 - E 4 
This implies that: 
(3.70) = 1 
For Case 2, we only prove the £ > 3 case. The i — 3 is case is similar. For Case 
I, by equations (3.8) and (3.9) for any j < % — 2 we have: 
3 3 +1 
(3.71) (a-2QA^2skA)-(a-2QAJ^skA) = QAsjA 
k=1 k=1 
J J+l 
(3.72) ( a - 2 g B 5 3 4 ) - ( o - 2 g B 5 3 s | ) = QBsjB 
k=1 fc=l 
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Hence: 
(3.73) 2sja+1 = sJ' A 
J+1 _ J (3.74) 2 s g 1 = s' 
Hence, for any j < i — 1 we have: 
(3-75) 4 = 5i 
1 (3.76) 4 = — ^ 
Equation (3.62) follows from equation (3.60) and the fact that s\ 1 = 1 
sA- Now, we derive equation (3.63). Prom equation (3.11) we know that: 
i-2 £—1 
(3.77) (a-2QBJ24)-(a-QA-QB^2skB) = QBs^ 
fc=l *;=1 
(3.78) 4 = 1 
K-1 
k 
a 
k=1 
Hence: 
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i—2 i-1 
2 
B 
k=1 fc=l 
(3.79) ( - 2 Q b E s | ) - ( a - Q A - Q B J 2 4 ) = Qbs 
Hence, we have: 
i - 2 
"B QA + QBS'S1 = QBS^2 + QBJ2SB 
fc=l 
i—3 
+ = <3B4~3 + <2B 
*:=i 
+ = 2 Q b 4 
This implies that: 
i - i _
 0 „ i ^ (3.80) s^"1 = 2 4 - ^ 
Case III directly follows from equations (3.12), (3.14), and (3.80). • 
Corollary 3.2 (Corollary to Proposition 3.3). For any % = 2,3,..., K + 1 we 
have: 
(3.81) 24"1 < 
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Proof. By Proposition 3.3 we know that: 
i—2 »-l 
(3.82) (a - 2 Qa £ skA) - ( a - 2 QA ^ s\) < QAS'A2 
k=1 fc=l 
Hence: 
(3.83) 2 s ? < 
• 
Now, by utilizing the results above we solve the linear demand case for an 
arbitrary i. The solution for z = 2 case is already given in Corollary 3.1. Hence, 
in what follows we assume that z > 2. 
Using Case II in Proposition 3.2 we have: 
(3.84) Qas'X1 + Qbs'B1 = QAS'X2 
Also from Corollary 3.2 we have: 
- 1 ^ 1 „»-2 (3.85) 571 < -8 A 
Thus we get the following system which will characterize i 
(3.86) y + x + 2x + 4x + ... + 2i~3x = 
(3.87) (K -i+2)(x-y) + x + 2x-{-4x + ... + 2i~3x = 
(3.88) 0 < 
(3.89) QA < 
Letting Hi = 2i~2 - 1 and Kt = K - l + 2 we have: 
(3.90) y + HiX = QA 
(3.91) -Kty + {Ki + Hi)x = QB 
(3.92) 0 < y < | 
(3.93) QA < QB 
Solving for x and y we have: 
I l l 
(3.94) x = R * Q a + Q b 
(3.95) y = 
KIHT + KI + H-L 
KIQa + HAQA-QB) 
KiHi + Ki + Hi 
From the inequality (3.92) we have: 
(3.96) > 2 ± > 
KT + 2HT ~ QB KI + HT 
H~2 H a 
Let 6. = and A{ = g.+H.' Now, we show the uniqueness of the equilib-
rium. Note that it is enough to show that {[di, Aj)}? partitions [0,1]. This simply 
means that for any given ^ value, there will be one and only one corresponding 
set [0$, A{). This set identifies the i that gives the equilibrium. First, note that 
^ > 0 and ^ > 0. Moreover, we know that 0K + 1 = 1 and A2 = 0. Hence, if 
A; = di-1 for any i = 2,3,..., K, then {[9U Aj)}? partitions [0,1]. We want to show 
that: 
(3.97) = 
1 + 2 HT S—1 H. 
KI-X + 2H KI + HT 
or 
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(3.98) {l + 2Hi_1)(Ki + Hi)-{Ki„1 + 2Hl_x)H, = 0 
(3.99) Ki + 2KiHt_1+Hi + 2HiHi_1-Ki^Ht-2HiHi_1 = 0 
(3.100) Ki + 2KiHi_1+Hi-Ki_1Hi = 0 
(3.101) Ki + i H t - ^ K i + H t - K ^ H t = 0 
(3.102) H i(K i + = 0 
(3.103) Ht(K-i + 2 + l ) - ( K - ( i - l ) + 2)Ht = 0 
(3.104) 0 = 0 
We conclude that for any given ^ there exists a unique equilibrium for the 
quantity choices of A and B. The equilibrium is determined by the conditions 
from Corollary 3.1 and inequality system (3.96). 
Now, we consider the profits of the firms as a function of i. The profit of i is 
given by: 
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t t a = QA 
= QA 
= QA 
= QA 
= QA 
= QA 
= QA 
t - 2 i -2 
g ( a - 2<?A E 4 ) 4 + (a - £ 4 - Q A s ^ - Q b ^ 1 ) 4 " 1 
fc=i fc=i 
r
 t_2 ? -2 ? - 2 
a + { - 2 Q A £ ( E s a ) 4 + ( - 2 Q A £ 4 - V a 1 
fc=i 
i - 2 
k=\ 
a + {-2Qa iTsA)^r4 + (-2Qa £ g i ^ " 2Qa ^ 4 ) ^ 4 
I. ' - 1 fc=i fc=i 2
k
~ fc=i 
J L - 1 * 1 
2?-3 + 2? a + | - 2 ^ [ ( 2 - — ) 4 ] 2 - 2QA(2 - ^ + 
a - 2Qa[S\]2 { [ ( 2 - + (2 - ^ + 
a - 2Q„[4]2 | 4 - 32± + 64(1)2 + 8 1 - 3 2 ( | ) 2 + 1 6 ( | ) 2 
a - 2 g A [ 4 ] 2 | 4 - 2 4 i + 4 8 ( | 
Note that > 0. 
3.3. Cournot with price discrimination 
In this section we provide generalization of the benchmark Cournot competition 
model. Our generalization of the Cournot model is reminiscent of Hazledine's 
(2006) model. In this model, as in the former section, we assume that there are 
two firms, A and B, in the market. We normalize the costs of the firms to zero. 
The firms divide the consumers into K bins according to their reservation prices. 
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The demand is assumed to be linear and given by equation (3.56). We assume 
that firms are playing a two-stage game where in the first stage they choose the 
capacities and in the second stage they simultaneously choose the shares that they 
assign to each bin. 
The symmetric solution would imply that Q = Qa = Qb- This implies that 
both firms are using all available bins. By Corollary 3.1, we conclude that: 
(3.106) 
(3.105) 
or 
(3.107) 9a = 9B = 
_ l 
2K~i 
These quantities accord with the findings of Hazledine (2006). 
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